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Abstract
We pose Witsenhausen’s problem as a leader-follower game of incomplete information. The follower
makes a noisy observation of the leader’s action (who moves first) and chooses an action minimizing
her expected deviation from the leader’s action. Knowing this, leader who observes the realization of the
state, chooses an action that minimizes her distance to the state of the world and the ex-ante expected
deviation from the follower’s action. We study the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game and identify
a class of “near piecewise-linear equilibria” when leader cares much more about being close to the
follower than the state, and the state is highly volatile. As a major consequence of this result, we prove
the existence of a set of local minima for Witsenhausen’s problem in form of slopey quantizers, which
are at most a constant factor away from the optimal cost.
Index Terms
Decentralized control, optimal stochastic control, incomplete information games, perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, asymptotic quantization theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
In his seminal work [1], Witsenhausen constructed a simple two-stage Linear-Quadratic-
Gaussian (LQG) decentralized control problem where the optimal controller happens to be
nonlinear. This example showed for the first time that linear quadratic Gaussian team problems
can have nonlinear solutions. Using this counterexample, [2] produced an example showing that
the standard decentralized static output feedback optimal control problem of linear deterministic
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2systems could also admit nonlinear solutions.1 For nearly half a century, this counterexample
has been a subject of intense research across multiple communities ([5]–[10]).
The endogenous information structure of Witsenhausen’s counterexample, where the signal
observed in the second stage is a noisy version of the control action in the first stage, gives
rise to a nonclassical information structure. While the problem looks deceptively simple with
quadratic cost, it is actually a very complicated, nonconvex, functional optimization problem. This
counterexample has shed light on intricacies of optimal decisions in stochastic team optimization
problems with similar information structure. Naturally, this problem has given rise to a large
body of literature. For example, [11] provides a variant of Witsenhausen’s counterexample with
discrete primitive random variables and finite support, where no optimal solution exists. Another
interesting variant, with the same information structure but different cost function, is the Gaussian
test channel ([6], [12]) where the linear strategies can be shown to be optimal. Interestingly, [13]
shows that if the objective function in [1] is changed to a worst case induced norm, the linear
controllers dominate nonlinear policies.
Although the optimal strategy and optimal cost for Witsenhausen’s counterexample are still
unknown, it can be shown that carefully designed nonlinear strategies can largely outperform
the linear strategies (see, e.g., the multi-point quantization strategies proposed by [7]). This
result, in particular, implies the fragility of the comparative statics and policies solely derived
based on the linear strategies in problems with similar setting. A relevant line of research is
to provide error bounds on the proximity to optimality for approximate solutions. [14], [15]
use information theoretic techniques and vector versions of the original problem to provide such
bounds. In [16], authors provide a general result on when one can approximate a continuous team
decision problem with a finite one through quantized approximations, using which they show
that quantized policies are asymptotically optimal for Witsenhausen’s counterexample. There
are also several works aiming to approximate the optimal solution. [17]–[20] employ different
heuristic approaches, all confirming what one might intuitively call an almost piecewise-linear
form for the optimal controller. However, a complete optimality proof for such strategies has
been elusive.
1Another relevant setting in which nonlinear equilibria may emerge is the seminal work of Crawford and Sobel ([3]) on
signaling games where misaligned objectives of a sender and a receiver can result in quantized equilibrium strategies. Recently,
authors in [4] consider an extension of this model to a noisy channel setup and show that for a Gaussian source and scalar
signals the equilibrium encoder is linear.
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3Although Witsenhausen’s counterexample has been around for half a century, a little is known
about the topological properties of its optimal solution (e.g., whether it is continuous or not,
the number of its fixed points, etc.). A breakthrough in this direction is [8], where authors view
Witsenhausen’s setup in an optimal transport theory framework. This enables them not only to
prove the existence of the optimal solution in a much more condense fashion, but also to derive
some important characteristics of the optimal solution. In particular, they show that the optimal
controller is a strictly increasing function with a real analytic left inverse.2 As a consequence,
no piecewise-linear strategy can be optimal, though not ruling out the possibility of a “near
piecewise-linear” optimal solution.
In this paper, following Witsenhausen’s original intuition, we view the problem as a leader-
follower coordination game in which the action of the leader is corrupted by an additive noise,
before reaching the follower. The leader aims to coordinate with the follower while staying close
to the observed state, recognizing that her action is not observed perfectly. As a result, she needs
to signal the follower in a manner that can be decoded efficiently. More than a mere academic
counterexample, the above setup could model a scenario where coordination happens across
generations and the insights of the leader who is from a different generation is corrupted/lost
by the time the message reaches the future generations. If the leader can internalize the fact
that her actions will not be observed perfectly, how should she act to make sure coordination
occur? When the leader cares far more about coordination with the follower than staying “on the
message”, the near piecewise-linear equilibrium strategy of the leader coarsens the observation in
well-spaced intervals, rather than merely broadcasting a linearly scaled version of the observed
state (as the linear strategy would suggest).
To this end, we analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game and show that strong
complementarity3 between the leader and the follower combined with a prior with poor enough
precision can give rise to nonlinear equilibria, and in particular, equilibria in form of what
has been deemed in the literature as slopey quantizers [22]. We subsequently show that these
equilibria are indeed local minima of the original Witsenhausen’s problem. Using some related
results from asymptotic quantization theory ([23]–[25]) together with analytical lower bounds
2Note that this does not imply the continuity of the optimal solution.
3Games of strategic complementarities are those in which the best response of each player is increasing in actions of others
[21].
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4on the optimal cost of Witsenhausen’s problem derived in [15], we further show that these local
minima include near-optimal solutions in the sense that their corresponding cost is at most a
constant factor away from the optimal one. Our work thus provides an analytical support for
the local optimality of slopey quantization strategies for Witsenhausen’s counterexample for a
highly volatile state.
The main idea behind the proof is to carefully construct a class of what we informally refer
to as near piecewise-linear or slopey quantization strategies for the leader that stays invariant
under the best response operator. These strategies can be viewed as small-slope variations of
a fixed-rate scalar quantizer minimizing the mean squared quantization error ([23]–[25]). Such
an optimal quantizer is characterized by optimality conditions on the threshold levels which
determine the boundaries of the quantization cells (or segments) and quantization levels: i)
quantization levels must be the centroid of the segments, and ii) thresholds in between two
adjacent quantization levels must be equidistant from them. For any fixed number of segments,
we consider the strategies whose segments are in a vicinity of the optimal MSE quantizer, have
a unique fixed point in each segment close to the quantization level, and are almost linear within
each segment with a near-zero derivative. For such strategies, leader’s actions remain very close
to fixed points of the strategy in each segment. Therefore, well-spaced fixed points (combined
with appropriate relative prior of the state in different segments) reveal the leader’s actions to the
follower with high probability, making the “signal” easily decodable. As a consequence, we can
characterize the best response of the follower to leader’s strategy. Using this characterization, we
show that the best response of the leader to follower’s strategy also varies very little, essentially
remaining near piecewise-linear over most of the range of the observed signals.
A key challenge in deriving the invariance property for this set of strategies for the leader is
to bound and tightly control the displacement in the fixed points and endpoints of the segments
of leader’s strategy under the best response operator. One major observation here is that the
fixed points of the leader’s best responses are local minimizers of the expected deviation of the
leader’s action from the follower (which is known to be a non-convex functional [8]). This insight
allows us to show that the fixed points of the leader’s best response lie in a tight neighborhood
of the fixed points of the follower’s strategy. We then show that the fixed points of the follower’s
strategy in turn lie in a vicinity of a convex combination of the leader’s fixed points and the
expected value of the state of the world within each segment. Combining the two, we can
May 8, 2019 DRAFT
5derive an approximate dynamics for the displacement in the fixed points and endpoints of the
segments in leader’s strategy under the best response. Using this approximate dynamics, we then
characterize an invariant set of fixed points and interval endpoints for leader’s strategy, which
we can then use in order to prove the existence of a near piecewise-linear equilibrium strategy
for the leader.
II. MODEL
We view Witsenhausen’s problem ([1]) as a game between a leader L and a follower F . Before
the agents act, the state of the world θ is drawn from a normal distribution with zero mean and
variance σ2. The leader can observe the realization of θ and acts first. The payoff of the leader
is given as follows
uL = −rL(θ − aL)2 − (1− rL)(aF − aL)2, (1)
where aF is the action of the follower and 0 < rL < 1. The follower makes a private, noisy
observation of the leader’s action, s = aL + δ where δ ∼ N(0, 1). The payoff of the follower is
given by
uF = −(aL − aF )2. (2)
We consider the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game and show that they reduce to the
Bayes Nash equilibria due to the Gaussian noise in the observation.4 Denote with a∗L(θ) and
a∗F (s) the equilibrium strategies, and with ν
∗(·|s) the follower’s belief on leader’s action given
s. Due to the normal noise in the observation, ν∗(·|s) is fully determined by a∗L(θ) and the prior
as there are no off-equilibrium-path information sets. Equilibrium strategies should thus satisfy
a∗F (s) =Eν∗ [a∗L|s] =
∫ ∞
−∞
aLν
∗(aL|s)daL,
a∗L(θ) = argmax
aL
−rL(θ − aL)2
− (1− rL)
∫ ∞
−∞
(a∗F (s)− aL)2φ(s− aL)ds, (3)
where φ(·) denotes the standard normal density function.
4See, e.g., [26] for a definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium and Bayes Nash equilibrium.
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6Our model yields the original setup in [1] by choosing rL
1−rL = k
2. The expected control
cost then maps to the (negated) expected payoff of the leader. It is a simple exercise to find
the optimal solution to Witsenhausen’s problem in the class of linear strategies (see Lemma 11
in [1]), which is also an equilibrium of the game described above. Witsenhausen ([1]) showed
that, for sufficiently large σ, this linear solution is not optimal. In fact, the linear solution can
be extremely suboptimal in the sense that the asymptotic ratio of the corresponding cost to the
optimal one is infinity ([7]). Our objective in this paper is to characterize a set of local minima
for the problem in [1], with a near piecewise-linear strategy for the leader and a cost within
a constant factor of the optimal one, given a sufficiently large σ. To this end, we analyze the
equilibria of the game described above in regime 1
2
≤ rLσ2 ≤ 1 and sufficiently large σ.5
III. NONLINEAR EQUILIBRIA
We first prove the existence of a collection of equilibria with a near piecewise-linear strategy
for the leader for sufficiently large values of σ. Our approach is to identify a set of such strategies
for the leader which is invariant under the best response operator. We characterize such a set in
the next section.
Given m ∈ N, consider a partition of the normal distribution N(0, σ2) into 2m+ 1 segments
∪mk=−mBQk , with BQk = [bQk , bQk+1) for k ∈ Nm, BQ0 = (bQ−1, bQ1 ), and BQ−k = (bQ−k−1, bQ−k], with
bQ−k = −bQk and bQm+1 = −bQ−m−1 = +∞. Denote with cQk the centroid of segment BQk , that is,
cQk = EN(0,σ2)[θ|θ ∈ BQk ]. Clearly, cQ0 = 0 and cQ−k = −cQk for k ∈ Nm. We now specifically
focus on a partition where the interval endpoints bQk are equidistant from the centroids adjacent to
them, i.e., bQk =
cQk−1+c
Q
k
2
for k ∈ Nm. We can show that such a partition exists and is unique. This
partition in fact corresponds to the (2m+ 1)-level fixed-rate scalar quantizer that minimizes the
mean-square distortion for a source characterized by θ ∼ N(0, σ2) ([23]–[25]). The properties
of this quantizer as m → ∞ are extensively studied in asymptotic quantization theory, as will
be discussed and used in analyzing the asymptotic performance of our proposed local minima
in Section IV.
Roughly speaking, the set of strategies we propose for the leader are a class of (2m + 1)-
segmented strategies with segments being close to BQk (−m ≤ k ≤ m), with a fixed point in each
segment in a certain vicinity of cQk (−m ≤ k ≤ m), and almost linear with a slope close to rL
5This clearly covers the case k2σ2 = 1.
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7cQ1 =
E[θ|θ∈BQ1 ]
Q Q Q QQQQQQ
Fig. 1. Partition of the normal distribution in a (2m+ 1)-level optimal MSE quantizer, for m = 2.
over each segment. Before proceeding further, we present some (non-asymptotic) properties of
this base configuration, which will facilitate the proof of the invariance property for the proposed
set of strategies.
Lemma 1. Given m ∈ N, consider the partition of the normal distribution N(0, σ2) in a (2m+1)-
level optimal MSE quantizer as described above. Define the k-th half-step of the quantizer as
xQk =
cQk −cQk−1
2
, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then,
i) 1− (xQm
σ
)2 ≤ cQmxQm
σ2
≤ 1. If m ≥ 2, then 3
4
≤ cQmxQm
σ2
≤ 1.
ii) For 1 ≤ k < m,
φ(
bQk
σ
)
φ(
cQk
σ
)
≤ (x
Q
k+1
xQk
)2 ≤ φ(
bQk
σ
)
φ(
bQk+1
σ
)
. (4)
As a result, 1 ≤ x
Q
k+1
xQk
≤ e, for 1 ≤ k < m.
iii) For 0 ≤ j ≤ k ≤ m, we have Prob[θ|θ∈B
Q
k ]
Prob[θ|θ∈BQj ]
≤ 1+e
2
.
iv) For any m ≥ 5,
√
3pi
e
√
10m
≤x
Q
1
σ
≤
√
2pie
2m
,
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81.1
√
lnm− 1
1.1
√
lnm
≤c
Q
m
σ
≤ 2√2 lnm+ 1.4 + 1.45,
1
2
√
2 lnm+ 6
≤x
Q
m
σ
≤ 1
1.1
√
lnm
. (5)
Proof. See the appendix. 
Next, we construct a set of (2m+1)-segmented increasing odd functions, denoted by AmL (rL, σ)
satisfying the following properties:
Property 1. For every aL(θ) ∈ AmL (rL, σ), there exist 2m + 1 segments Bk = [bk, bk+1), for
k ∈ Nm, B0 = (−b1, b1), and B−k = (b−k−1, b−k], with bm+1 = −b−m−1 = +∞ such that:
• aL(θ) is increasing and odd (i.e., aL(−θ) = −aL(θ)), and is smooth over each interval.
• aL(θ) has a unique fixed point in each segment. That is, for each interval Bk, (−m ≤ k ≤
m), there exists a unique ck ∈ Bk such that aL(ck) = ck, with c0 = 0.
We also impose the constraint that interval endpoints bk remain close to midpoints of [ck−1, ck]
and that fixed points ck remain within certain vicinity of c
Q
k ’s.
Property 2. For every k ∈ Nm, |bk − ck−1+ck2 | ≤ 0.1rL. Moreover, |ck − cQk | ≤ 2.9.
From the above property, if we define x¯k = x
Q
k + 3 and ¯
xk = x
Q
k − 3 for 1 ≤ k ≤ m, then
x¯k and
¯
xk represent upper and lower bounds on the lengths of both half-intervals [ck−1, bk] and
[bk, ck+1].
Finally, we impose a constraint on the slope of aL(θ) in each interval, keeping the slope very
close to rL, as well as a linear bound on aL(θ) in the tail. We impose the following property:
Property 3. For every −m < k < m and θ ∈ Bk,
¯
r ≤ d
dθ
aL(θ) ≤ r¯, where
¯
r = rL(1− 0.5r2Lσ2)
and r¯ = rL(1 + 0.5r2Lσ
2). For the tail interval Bm,
¯
r ≤ d
dθ
aL(θ) ≤ r¯ for bm < θ < cm +
√
eσx¯m.
For θ > cm +
√
eσx¯m we have aL(θ) ≤ cm + 3rL(θ − cm).6
For any σ > 0, define M(σ) = {m ∈ N|xQ1 > 2
√
2 lnσ + 5, m ≥ 25}.7 We then claim
that the set of strategies AmL (rL, σ) for m ∈ M(σ), characterized by Property 1-3, is invariant
6We state the properties (and in many cases the analysis) only for θ ≥ 0. The counterpart for θ ≤ 0 is immediate since the
function is odd.
7 As we will see in Section IV, this ensures inclusion of local minima with an expected cost within a constant factor of the
optimal cost.
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9under the best response operator for sufficiently large values of σ in the regime 1
2
≤ rLσ2 ≤ 1.
We formally state this result here, and provide the proof which is based on the best response
analysis carried out in Section V, in the appendix.
Theorem 1. Consider the regime 1
2
≤ rLσ2 ≤ 1 with σ > 0. Then, the set of (2m+1)-segmented
strategies AmL (rL, σ) for the leader characterized by Property 1-3, where m ∈ M(σ) = {m ∈
N|xQ1 > 2
√
2 lnσ+5, m ≥ 25} and σ ≥ 300, is nonempty and invariant under the best response
operator.8 Moreover, the game described in Section II has an equilibrium for which:
i) a∗L(θ, rL, σ) ∈ AmL (rL, σ), and
ii) (a∗L(θ, rL, σ), a
∗
F (s) = Eδ[a∗L|s]) maximizes the expected payoff of the leader over all pair
of strategies (aL(θ, rL, σ), aF (s) = Eδ[aL|s]) where aL(θ, rL, σ) ∈ AmL (rL, σ).
Proof. See the appendix. 
We expect the above theorem to hold for much smaller values of σ and much smaller number
of levels (2m+1), by optimizing/tightening the bounds used in deriving this result. While this is
in principle doable, we believe this would sacrifice clarity given the tedious calculations required,
and would substantially increase the length of the paper.
IV. LOCAL MINIMA AND ASYMPTOTIC PERFORMANCE GUARANTEES
Let
U(aL, aF)=−Eθ[uL(θ, aL, aF )] =rL
∫ ∞
−∞
(θ − aL(θ))2
φ( θ
σ
)
σ
dθ
+(1− rL)
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
(aF (s)− aL(θ))2φ(s− aL(θ))
φ( θ
σ
)
σ
dsdθ, (6)
for any two measurable functions aL, aF : R→ R. As discussed in Section II, U(aL, aF ) defined
above maps to the expected cost of the original Witsenhausen’s problem in [1]. The aim of this
section is to study the performance of the equilibrium strategies characterized by Theorem 1 in
view of the above cost function. Being an equilibrium implies that the cost cannot be improved
by changing one of the strategies a∗L or a
∗
F while keeping the other fixed, although this does not
rule out the possibility of obtaining a lower cost by simultaneously changing both strategies.9
8Recall that xQ1 is the first half-step in a (2m+ 1)-level optimal MSE quantizer.
9We thank Anant Sahai for bringing this point into the authors’ attention.
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10
With a bit of manipulation, however, we can show that the image of the strategy obtained from
an infinitesimal variation in a∗L also lies within A
m
L , using which we can show that (a
∗
L, a
∗
F ) is
indeed a local minimum of U .
Lemma 2. Any pair of equilibrium strategies (a∗L, a∗F ) characterized by Theorem 1, where a∗L ∈
AmL (rL, σ) and a
∗
F (s) = Eδ[a∗L|s]10, is a local minimum of the cost functional U in (6).
Proof. See the appendix. 
We now have the first main result of the paper: a near piecewise-linear strategy for the leader
(or first controller) that leads to a local minimum of Witsenhausen’s problem. Although the
importance of such strategies has been already noticed in the literature ([17]–[20]), no analytical
result concerning the optimality of such strategies is reported in the literature. Theorem 1 also
presents an important result in the context of two-stage games of incomplete information.
We next aim to evaluate the asymptotic performance of these local minima with respect to the
optimal cost. According to Theorem 1, (a∗L, a
∗
F ) is a minimizer of U over the pair of strategies
(aL, aF ) with aL ∈ AmL (rL, σ). Therefore, we can use any other pair of strategies with the leader’s
strategy being in AmL (for which it is easier to evaluate the cost) to find an upper bound for
U(a∗L, a
∗
F ). For this purpose we use U(a
∗
L, a
∗
F ) ≤ U(aQL , aQF ), where aQL is the piecewise-linear
strategy with segments BQk and fixed points c
Q
k specified in the base configuration in Section III
and d
dθ
aQL(θ) = rL over each interval, and a
Q
F is the optimal (2m+ 1)-level MSE quantizer (i.e.,
constant value of cQk over segment B
Q
k ). It is easy to see that (θ−aQL(θ))2 = (1−rL)2(θ−aQF (θ))2.
We can thus write U(aQL , a
Q
F ) = rL(1− rL)2DQL + (1− rL)DQF , with
DQL =
∫ ∞
−∞
(θ − aQF (θ))2
φ( θ
σ
)
σ
dθ,
DQF =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
(aQF (s)− aQL(θ))2φ(s− aQL(θ))
φ( θ
σ
)
σ
dsdθ. (7)
DQF can be upper-bounded as D
Q
F ≤ 4
√
2
e
(2−rL)2
(1−rL)2φ(
xQ1√
2
) + r2LD
Q
L (see the proof of Lemma 3).
We can find the exact asymptotic value of DQL using results from asymptotic quantization theory
([23]–[25]): DQL is the mean-square error of an optimal (2m + 1)-level MSE quantizer for a
source θ ∼ N(0, σ2) (see, e.g., [25]). It is known that for large m, DQL ≈ c∞(2m+1)2 , where c∞ is
10Recall that δ ∼ N(0, 1) is the noise in the follower’s observation.
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the Panter-Dite constant of a normal source given by
c∞ =
1
12
(∫ ∞
−∞
(
φ( θ
σ
)
σ
)
1
3dθ
)3
=
√
3pi
2
σ2. (8)
Another interesting exact asymptotic equality is (2m + 1)x
Q
1
σ
≈
√
6pi
2
using which we can
alternatively write DQL ≈ (x
Q
1 )
2
√
3
as m→∞. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For the pair of equilibrium strategies (a∗L, a∗F ) characterized by Theorem 1, where
a∗L ∈ AmL (rL, σ), a∗F (s) = Eδ[a∗L|s], and m ∈M(σ) we have
lim inf
m→∞
rL(1−rL)(xQ1 )2√
3
+ 4
√
2
e
(2−rL)2
(1−rL) φ(
xQ1√
2
)
U(a∗L, a
∗
F )
≥ 1. (9)
Proof. See the appendix. 
The above asymptotic upper bound on U(a∗L, a
∗
F ) is minimized when x
Q
1 ≈ 2
√
2 lnσ for
large σ, with number of levels (2m + 1) ≈
√
3piσ
4
√
lnσ
and yielding a cost ≈ 8rL lnσ√
3
. Recalling
that M(σ) = {m ∈ N|xQ1 > 2
√
2 lnσ + 5,m ≥ 25}, this implies the existence of a local
minimum with near piecewise-linear strategy for the leader with a cost asymptotically as low
as 8rL lnσ√
3
. To compare with the optimal solution, we use the lower bounds on the optimal cost
of Witsenhausen’s problem derived in [15]. The following lemma is an immediate result of
Theorem 4 in [15].
Lemma 4. Denote with U∗(σ) the minimum value of the cost functional U(aL, aF ) given by (6)
in the regime rLσ2 = 1. Then
lim sup
σ→∞
lnσ
6σ2
U∗(σ)
≤ 1. (10)
Proof. See the appendix. 
This lower bound is quite loose (as also pointed out by the authors in [15]), but still serves
our purpose of showing that our proposed set of local optima include solutions that are only a
constant factor away from the optimal cost as σ → ∞.11 We summarize the main findings of
this section in the theorem below.
11The ratio between the upper and lower bounds in [15] is almost 100. For the well-known case of σ = 5 and k2σ2 = 1, the
lowest known cost ≈ 0.167 is only 12.5 times the value obtained from the lower bound.
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Theorem 2. Any pair of equilibrium strategies (a∗L, a∗F ) characterized by Theorem 1, where
a∗L ∈ AmL (rL, σ) and a∗F (s) = Eδ[a∗L|s], is a local minimum of the cost functional U in (6).
Moreover,
lim inf
σ→∞
8rL lnσ√
3
minm∈M(σ) U(a∗L, a
∗
F )
≥ 1. (11)
In the regime rLσ2 = 1, at least one of these local minima are less than 27.8 times away from
the optimal value, as σ →∞.
Proof. See the appendix. 
V. BEST RESPONSE ANALYSIS
The objective of this section is to prove Theorem 1 on the invariance of the set of strategies
AmL (rL, σ) (for m ∈M(σ)), and the existence of an equilibrium with the leader’s strategy in this
set. The first step in verifying the invariance of AmL (rL, σ) is to characterize the best response of
the follower aF (s) to the leader’s strategy aL(θ) ∈ AmL (rL, σ). We can then use these properties
to find the updated best response of the leader to aF (s), denoted by a˜L(θ) and enforce its
inclusion in AmL (rL, σ).
The follower’s best response to the strategy of the leader aL(θ) is the expected action of the
leader given the observation s = aL+δ, that is aF (s) = Eδ[aL|s]. Following a simple application
of Bayes rule we can obtain
aF (s) =
∫∞
−∞ aL(θ)φ(s− aL(θ))φ( θσ )dθ∫∞
−∞ φ(s− aL(θ))φ( θσ )dθ
. (12)
Using this, we can easily show that aF (s) is analytic and increasing, with ddsaF (s) = Var[aL|s]
(see [1] for a proof).
In order to characterize aF (s), we start by estimating the expected action of the leader and
its variance conditioned on the interval to which θ belongs. Actions of the leader in interval Bk
(k 6= ±m) are well-concentrated around ck. In fact aL(θ) ∈ [ck − r¯x¯k, ck + r¯x¯k+1] for θ ∈ Bk,
from which the lemma below follows immediately.
Lemma 5. For 0 ≤ k < m, |E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bk] − ck| ≤ r¯x¯k+1 and Var[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bk] ≤
r¯2( x¯k+x¯k+1
2
)2.
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Proof. See the appendix. 
The analysis is a bit involved in the tail, since for θ > cm the leader’s actions are not in a
bounded vicinity of cm anymore. However, we can derive several useful properties for the tail
as well.
Lemma 6. Consider a tail observation by the leader (i.e., θ ∈ Bm). Then,
E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bm]− cm ≤ r¯x¯m+1, (13)
for s ≤ cm + x¯m+1, where x¯m+1 =
√
ex¯m. For s > cm + x¯m+1, we have
E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bm]− cm ≤ 3rLσ(s− cm + 1). (14)
Also, E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bm]− cm ≥ −r¯x¯m. As for the variance,
Var[aL(θ)|s, θ∈Bm]≤

1
3
, for s < cm−1
3
4
r¯2(x¯m+x¯m+1
2
)2, for cm−1≤s≤cm+x¯m+1
2.5r2Lσ
2(s−cm)2, for s> cm + x¯m+1.
(15)
Proof. See the appendix. 
Let the signal observed by the follower be between ck and ck+1, i.e., s = ck + δ with 0 ≤ δ ≤
ck+1− ck. Then, we claim that the follower’s posterior on θ given s has a negligible probability
out of the neighboring intervals Bk ∪Bk+1.
Lemma 7. Let the observed signal by the follower be s = ck + δ, where 0 ≤ δ ≤ ck+1 − ck,
with k ≥ 0. Then, for any j ≥ 1,
Prob[θ ∈ Bk−j|s]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk|s] ≤ e
− (ck−ck−j)
2
2
+3j+1. (16)
Similarly,
Prob[θ ∈ Bk+j+1|s]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk+1|s] ≤ e
− (ck+j+1−ck+1)
2
2
+3j+1. (17)
Proof. See the appendix. 
Using this lemma and the fact that the fixed points ck are well-spaced, we can show that the
effect of the intervals other than Bk and Bk+1 on aF (s) are negligible. In order to characterize
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the follower’s best response aF (s), we then need to focus only on the segments adjacent to
the observed signal, and in particular figure out the weight of each of these two neighboring
intervals in the follower’s posterior on θ. We do this in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Define
mk+1 =
ck + ck+1
2
+
1
∆k+1
ln
(
Prob[θ ∈ Bk]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk+1]
)
, (18)
where ∆k+1 = ck+1− ck. Also, write the signal observed by the follower as s = mk+1 + δ. Then,
for 0 ≤ k < m− 1,
e−∆k+1(δ+r¯x¯k+1)−
r¯2x¯2k+1
2 ≤ Prob[θ∈Bk|s]
Prob[θ∈Bk+1|s]≤e
∆k+1(r¯x¯k+2−δ)+
r¯2x¯2k+2
2 . (19)
For the case involving the tail segment Bm,
e−∆m(δ+r¯x¯m)−
r¯2x¯2m
2 ≤Prob[θ∈Bm−1|s]
Prob[θ∈Bm|s] ≤1.16e
−∆m(δ−r¯x¯m)+r¯
2x¯2m
2 . (20)
Proof. See the appendix. 
It is worth mentioning that mk+1 defined in the above lemma is quite close to the midpoint
of ck and ck+1. In particular, using Lemma 1 we can show that − 1.1∆k+1<mk+1−
ck+ck+1
2
< 2.3
∆k+1
.12
We can now characterize the best response of the follower aF (s) to the leader’s strategy aL(θ) ∈
AmL (rL, σ) up to the first order.
Lemma 9. Let s = mk+1 + δ, with ck ≤ s ≤ ck+1. Then
aF (s) ≥ ck + ∆k+1
1 + 1.17e−∆k+1δ
− 1.01r¯x¯k+2
aF (s) ≤ ck + 1.17∆k+1
1.17 + e−∆k+1δ
+ 1.01r¯x¯k+2. (21)
Also,
0≤ d
ds
aF (s)≤1.17e−∆k+1|δ|∆2k+1+1.01r¯2(
x¯k+x¯k+1
2
)2 for δ≤−0.5
0≤ d
ds
aF (s)≤1.17e−∆k+1|δ|∆2k+1+1.01r¯2(
x¯k+1+x¯k+2
2
)2 for δ>−0.5. (22)
12See the proof of Lemma 11 for details.
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Proof. See the appendix. 
Corollary 1. A useful consequence of Lemma 9 is that
aF (s) ≥ ck+1 − 1.17e−∆k+1δ∆k+1 − 1.01r¯x¯k+2
aF (s) ≤ ck + 1.17e∆k+1δ∆k+1 + 1.01r¯x¯k+2, (23)
and
0≤ d
ds
aF (s)≤1.17e−∆k+1|δ|∆2k+1 + 1.01r¯2x¯2k+2, (24)
where s = mk+1 + δ, with ck ≤ s ≤ ck+1.
Note that the exponential terms in the above bounds vanish quite fast for large ∆k+1 and |δ|.
for small |δ|, another useful upper bound on the derivative of aF (s) is
d
ds
aF (s) ≤ 1
4
(∆k+1 + 2r¯x¯k+2)
2 + 0.01r¯2x¯2k+2. (25)
Corollary 2. Let s = mk+1 + δ, with ck ≤ s ≤ ck+1. Then,
ck−1.1r¯x¯k+2≤aF (s)≤ck + 1.1r¯x¯k+2 for δ<−2
√
2 lnσ
5
ck+1−1.1r¯x¯k+2≤aF (s)≤ck+1 + 1.1r¯x¯k+2 for δ> 2
√
2 lnσ
5
. (26)
Roughly speaking, the above corollary says that, if the observed signal by the follower is
far enough from the midpoint of ck and ck+1, then the optimal action of the follower is well-
concentrated around ck or ck+1 (whichever that is closer), and changes very slowly according to
Lemma 9.13 However, aF (s) may have very high variations for s close to mk+1 as can be seen
from Lemma 9.
The following lemma characterizes aF (s) when follower makes a tail observation.
Lemma 10. Let s = cm + δ, where δ > 0. Then,
i) for δ ≤ x¯m+1, cm− 1.01r¯x¯m+1 ≤ aF (s) ≤ cm + r¯x¯m+1, and 0 ≤ ddsaF (s) ≤ 0.8r¯2( x¯m+x¯m+12 )2.
ii) for δ > x¯m+1, cm − 1.01r¯x¯m ≤ aF (s) ≤ cm + 3rLσ(δ + 1), and 0 ≤ ddsaF (s) ≤ 3r2Lσ2δ2.
13Note that 2
√
2 lnσ
5
< ¯
x1
5
<
∆k+1
10
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Proof. See the appendix. 
Lemma 9 and 10 provide the first order characteristics of the best response of the follower to
a leader’s strategy aL(θ) ∈ AmL (rL, σ). We are now ready to analyze the leader’s best response
a˜L(θ) to aF (s) and see if we can keep it in AmL (rL, σ). We have a˜L(θ) ∈ argmaxaL u˜L(θ, aL),
where
u˜L(θ, aL) =− rL(θ−aL)2
− (1−rL)
∫ ∞
−∞
(aF (s)− aL)2φ(s− aL)ds. (27)
Lemma 11. Consider θ ∈ [ck, ck+1], 0 ≤ k < m. Then, there exists a unique b˜k+1 ∈ [ck, ck+1]
such that
|a˜L(θ)− ck| < 5r¯x¯k+2 for θ < b˜k+1,
|a˜L(θ)− ck+1| < 5r¯x¯k+2 for θ > b˜k+1. (28)
Proof. See the appendix. 
The points b˜k+1 determine the segments of the best response strategy a˜L(θ). The leader’s best
response strategy clearly has a discontinuity at b˜k+1. However, as we show in the next lemma,
a˜L(θ) is differentiable at all points θ ∈ [ck, ck+1] \ {b˜k+1}. We further bound the derivative
of a˜L(θ) using the bounds on the follower’s strategy and its derivative derived in Lemma 9,
Corollary 1, and Corollary 2.
Lemma 12. Consider θ ∈ [ck, ck+1], 0 ≤ k < m, with θ 6= b˜k+1. Then,
d
dθ
a˜L(θ) ≥ rL
rL + (1− rL)(1 + 0.4r¯2σ2)
d
dθ
a˜L(θ) ≤ rL
rL + (1− rL)(1− 0.45r¯2σ2) . (29)
Proof. See the appendix. 
Using this lemma and the values
¯
r = rL(1−0.5r2Lσ2) and r¯ = rL(1+0.5r2Lσ2), we can easily
verify that
¯
r ≤ d
dθ
a˜L(θ) ≤ r¯. This means that Property 3 is preserved by the best response for
θ ∈ [−cm, cm]. We study the tail case later in Lemma 14. Next lemma identifies 2m + 1 local
minima of the MSE term in the leader’s payoff, each located in a tiny interval around a fixed
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point of aL(θ), establishing that they are indeed the fixed points of the best response strategy
a˜L(θ).
Lemma 13. Define
J˜L(aL) =
∫ ∞
−∞
(aF (s)− aL)2φ(s− aL)ds. (30)
Then, J˜L(aL) is strongly convex over [ck−5r¯x¯k+2, ck+5r¯x¯k+2] with d2da2L J˜L(aL) ≥ 2(1−0.45r¯
2σ2).
Let c˜k be the unique solution of
c˜k = argmin
aL∈[ck−5r¯x¯k+2,ck+5r¯x¯k+2]∩[b˜k,b˜k+1]
J˜L(aL). (31)
Then, a˜L(c˜k) = c˜k.
Proof. See the appendix. 
The fixed point characterized in the above lemma is the unique fixed point in [b˜k, b˜k+1] from
Property 3. Therefore, Property 1 is also preserved under the best response. Next lemma describes
the tail properties of a˜L(θ).
Lemma 14. If b˜m < θ < c˜m + σx¯m+1, then
¯
r ≤ d
dθ
a˜L(θ) ≤ r¯. For θ > c˜m + σx¯m+1, we have
a˜L(θ) ≤ c˜m + 3rL(θ − c˜m).
Proof. See the appendix. 
Now, in order to verify that the updated strategy a˜L(θ) satisfies Property 2, we need to bound
the displacements in the fixed points c˜k and endpoints b˜k.
Lemma 15. For the endpoints of the intervals corresponding to a˜L(θ), we have |b˜k+1− c˜k+c˜k+12 | ≤
0.1rL.
Proof. See the appendix. 
Bounding the displacement in c˜k can be done in multiple steps: first we need to relate the
fixed point of the leader’s best response a˜L(θ) in interval B˜k to the fixed point of aF (s) in Bk
(i.e., sk), followed by estimating sk in terms of ck and ek where ek = EN(0,σ2)[θ|θ ∈ Bk], that is,
the expected value of θ over Bk. Finally we bound the displacement in ek with the displacement
of the interval endpoints using properties of truncated normal distribution.
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Lemma 16. Let sk be the fixed point of aF (s) in the interval [ck − 5r¯x¯m+1, ck + 5r¯x¯m+1], i.e.,
aF (sk) = sk. Then,
|c˜k − sk| ≤ 0.42r2L(
x¯k + x¯k+1
2
)2 + 0.08r2L¯
x1. (32)
Proof. See the appendix. 
Lemma 17. sk can be located based on ck and ek as
|sk − (1− rL)ck − rLek| ≤ 1.9r2Lx¯k+1. (33)
Proof. See the appendix. 
Using Lemma 15-17, we can reach at
|c˜k − (1− rL)ck − rLeˆk| ≤ 0.42r2L(
x¯k + x¯k+1
2
)2 + 2r2Lx¯k+1, (34)
where eˆk = EN(0,σ2)[θ|θ ∈ Bˆk], with Bˆk = [bˆk, bˆk+1], bˆk = ck−1+ck2 and bˆk+1 = ck+ck+12 . We can
now use (34) and Lemma 15 to verify that Property 2 is also preserved by the best response,
completing the proof of the invariance of AmL (rL, σ) for m ∈M(σ) and σ ≥ 300 in the regime
1
2
≤ rLσ2 ≤ 1. This is carried out in the proof of the following theorem.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We studied Witsenhausen’s counterexample in a leader-follower game setup where the follower
makes noisy observations from the leader’s action and aims to choose her action as close as
possible to that of the leader. Leader who moves first and can see the realization of the state of
the world chooses her action to minimize her ex-ante distance from the follower’s action as well
as the state of the world. We showed the existence of nonlinear perfect Bayesian equilibria in the
regime 1
2
≤ rLσ2 ≤ 1, where the leader’s strategy is a perturbed near-piecewise-linear version
of an optimal MSE quantizer. We then proved that these equilibria are indeed local minima
of the original Witsenhausen’s problem. Incorporating some relevant results from asymptotic
quantization theory and lower bounds on the optimal cost of Witsenhausen’s problem from the
literature, we showed that the proposed local minima include solutions that are at most a constant
factor away from the optimal one.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. To avoid lengthy expressions, we introduce and work with normalized
variables xˆk =
xQk
σ
, bˆk =
bQk
σ
, cˆk =
cQk
σ
, and Bˆk =
BQk
σ
. All the expectations are then taken
using N(0, 1) as the probability measure.
i) Let ρ(h) = φ(h)
1−Φ(h) denote the Mill’s ratio. Then, 0 ≤ 1 − ρ(ρ − h) ≤ (ρ − h)2 (see, e.g.
[27] for a proof). This implies that 0 ≤ 1− cˆmxˆm ≤ xˆ2m. Moreover, xˆm is decreasing with
m and it follows from direct calculation that xˆ2 = 0.48 < 12 , hence completing the proof.
ii) Since cˆk is the centroid of segment Bˆk, we should have∫ cˆk
bˆk
(cˆk − θ)φ(θ)dθ =
∫ bˆk+1
cˆk
(θ − cˆk)φ(θ)dθ. (35)
This, together with the fact that
∫ cˆk
bˆk
(cˆk − θ)φ(θ)dθ ≤ φ(bˆk)
∫ cˆk
bˆk
(cˆk − θ)dθ and
∫ bˆk+1
cˆk
(θ −
cˆk)φ(θ)dθ ≥ φ(bˆk+1)
∫ bˆk+1
cˆk
(θ− cˆk)dθ proves the RHS inequality in (4). To derive the LHS,
let p1k = Prob[θ|bˆk ≤ θ ≤ cˆk] and p2k = Prob[θ|cˆk ≤ θ ≤ bˆk+1]. Noting that φ(θ) (for
θ ≥ 0) and cˆk − θ are decreasing with θ, we apply algebraic Chebyshev inequality to (35)
to obtain p1kxˆk ≤ p2kxˆk+1. On the other hand,
p2k
p1k
≤ xˆk+1
xˆk
× φ(cˆk)
φ(bˆk)
. (36)
Combining the two, we can derive the LHS in (4). It then immediately follows from the
LHS inequality that xˆk ≤ xˆk+1 for 1 ≤ k. Applying the result of part (i) to the RHS
inequality we can easily show that xˆk+1
xˆk
≤ e.
iii) A useful property here is that g(x) = 1
x
∫ a+x
a
φ(t)dt is decreasing in x for x, a > 0. Using
this, we can obtain
Prob[θ|θ ∈ Bˆk]
Prob[θ|θ ∈ Bˆj]
≤ xˆk + xˆk+1
xˆj + xˆj+1
× φ(bˆk)
φ(bˆj)
≤ xˆk + xˆk+1
xˆj + xˆj+1
× xˆ
2
j
xˆ2k
≤ 1 + e
2
xˆj
xˆk
≤ 1 + e
2
, (37)
where the last two lines follow from part (ii). We have to modify the proof for k =
m. To extend the proof to the case k = m, it suffices to show that Prob[θ|θ ∈ Bˆm] ≤
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Prob[θ|θ ∈ Bˆm−1]. We first note that
Prob[θ|θ ∈ Bˆm] = φ(bˆm)
cˆm
≤ 4
3
φ(bˆm)xˆm, (38)
where we have used part (i) in the last inequality. The proof now follows from the fact
that Prob[θ|θ ∈ Bˆm−1] > (xˆm−1 + xˆm)φ(bˆm) ≥ (1 + 1e)xˆmφ(bˆm).
iv) We start by showing that
e
1
2
(xˆ1+...+xˆk)
2 ≤ xˆk+1
xˆ1
≤ e 56 (xˆ1+...+xˆk+1)2 . (39)
The LHS easily follows from part (ii), while the RHS requires a more involved analysis
as we elaborate below. The idea here is to find an appropriate lower bound for the RHS
of (35). Using Jensen’s inequality for the function e−x, we can obtain∫ bˆk+1
cˆk
(θ − cˆk)φ(θ)dθ ≥
xˆ2k+1
2
√
2pi
e
− 1
2
∫ bˆk+1
cˆk
2θ2(θ−cˆk)
xˆ2
k+1
dθ
. (40)
Combining this with the same upper bound of xˆ
2
k
2
φ(bˆk) as in part (ii) for the LHS of (35)
and after some simplification we can reach at
xˆ2k+1
xˆ2k
≤ ecˆkxˆk+ 23 cˆkxˆk+1− xˆ
2
k
2
+
xˆ2k+1
4 . (41)
Substituting k with 1, . . . , k− 1 and multiplying all these k inequalities we can prove the
RHS inequality in (39).
Incorporating the simple inequality φ(xˆ1+...+xˆk)
φ(xˆ1+...+xˆk+1)
≤ e cˆmxˆm2 ≤ √e into (39), we can find that
xˆ1 ≤
√
2piexˆk+1φ(xˆ1 + . . .+ xˆk+1) for k = 1, . . . ,m− 1. Adding up all these inequalities
and xˆ1 ≤
√
2piexˆ1φ(xˆ1) yields
mxˆ1√
2pie
≤
m∑
k=1
xˆkφ(xˆ1 + . . .+ xˆk) ≤
∫ ∞
0
φ(θ)dθ =
1
2
, (42)
proving xˆ1 ≤
√
2pie
2m
.
Based on the RHS of (39) and following a similar approach we can show that
m−1∑
k=1
xˆk+1e
− 5
6
(xˆ1+...+xˆk)
2 ≤ e(m− 1)xˆ1. (43)
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On the other hand,∫ ∞
xˆ1+...+xˆm
e−
5
6
θ2dθ ≤ 6e
− 5
6
(xˆ1+...+xˆm)2
10(xˆ1 + . . .+ xˆm)
≤ 6e
− 5
6
(xˆ1+...+xˆm)2xˆm
10(xˆ1 + . . .+ xˆm)xˆm
≤ 1.6xˆ1, (44)
where the last inequality follows from (39) and part (i). Putting (43) and (44) together
we can show that emxˆ1 ≥
∫∞
0
e−
5
6
θ2dθ =
√
3pi
10
, which yields xˆ1 ≥
√
3pi√
10em
. Using (39) for
k = m− 1, together with xˆmcˆm ≤ 1 and xˆ1 ≤
√
2pie
2m
, we can find
1
2
√
1.2
≥ xˆm
√
ln
2mxˆm√
2pie
, (45)
using which we can show that xˆm ≤ 11.1√lnm , for m ≥ 5. This in turn implies that
cˆm ≥ 1
xˆm
− xˆm ≥ 1.1
√
lnm− 1
1.1
√
lnm
. (46)
Finally, using the LHS of (39) for k = m−1, together with xˆm ≤ 11.1√lnm and xˆ1 ≥
√
3pi√
10em
,
and some manipulation we can obtain
cˆm ≤ 2
√
2 lnm+ 1.4 +
2
1.1
√
lnm
≤ 2√2 lnm+ 1.4 + 1.45, (47)
for m ≥ 5. Along with cˆmxˆm ≥ 1− xˆ2m, this leads to
xˆm ≥ 1
cˆm
2
+
√
cˆ2m
4
+ 1
≥ 1
2
√
2 lnm+ 6
. (48)

Remark 1. Particular consequences of assuming m ≥ 25 and σ ≥ 300 and that m is such
that xQ1 > 2
√
2 lnσ + 5, are frequently used in the proofs concerning best response analysis.
We summarize these properties here to avoid confusion in case they are not explicitly mentioned
when used in the proofs.
1) xQm > 6x
Q
1 and c
Q
m > 13.5x
Q
m. This follows from direct calculation of the optimal (2m+1)-
level MSE quantizer for m = 25 and that x
Q
m
xQ1
and c
Q
m
xQm
are both increasing with m.
2) xQm < 0.262σ. This follows from direct calculation of the optimal (2m + 1)-level MSE
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quantizer for m = 25 and that x
Q
m
σ
is decreasing with m. As a result, x¯m = xQm+3 < 0.272σ
since σ ≥ 300.
3) xQ1 > 11.5. This follows from x
Q
1 > 2
√
2 lnσ+ 5 and σ ≥ 300. As a result,
¯
x1 = x
Q
1 −3 >
8.5.
4) m < σ
2
. This follows from part iv) of Lemma 1: 2m
σ
≤
√
2pie
xQ1
<
√
2pie
2
√
2 lnσ+5
< 1.
Proof of Lemma 5. This is an immediate result of Property 2. 
Proof of Lemma 6. We start with the case where aL(cm + σx¯m+1) ≤ s ≤ cm + x¯m+1. Let
θc = cm + σx¯m+1 and δc = s − aL(θc). With some manipulation, we can show that for every
bm ≤ θ, θ′ ≤ θc,
Prob[θ′|s]
Prob[θ|s] =
φ(s− aL(θ′))φ( θ′σ )
φ(s− aL(θ))φ( θσ )
≥ φ(
θ′
σ
)φ(δc + r¯(θc − θ′))
φ( θ
σ
)φ(δc +
¯
r(θc − θ))
. (49)
Integrating with respect to θ′ and after some simplification, we arrive at
Prob[θ|s, bm ≤ θ ≤ θc] ≤ φ(δc + ¯r(θc − θ))
φ(δc + r¯(θc − θ))
φ¯(θ)
Φ¯(θc)− Φ¯(bm)
≤ ξ φ¯(θ)
Φ¯(θc)− Φ¯(bm) , (50)
where φ¯ ∼ N(µ¯, ν¯2), with µ¯ = r¯σ2(δc+r¯θc)
1+r¯2σ2
and ν¯2 = σ
2
1+r¯2σ2
< σ2, and
ξ =
φ(δc +
¯
r(θc − bm))
φ(δc + r¯(θc − bm)) . (51)
Using δc ≤ x¯m+1−
¯
rσx¯m+1, it is easy to verify that δc+ rL(θc− bm) < x¯m+1 + 1. It then follows
that
ln ξ = (r¯ −
¯
r)(θc − bm)(δc + rL(θc − bm))
≤ r3Lσ2(
√
eσ + 1)x¯m(
√
ex¯m + 1) < 0.001, (52)
for σ ≥ 300 and m ≥ 25 (for which xQm < 0.262σ), implying that ξ < 1.01.
A useful formula is
1
σ2
VarN(µ,σ2)[θ|c ≤ θ] = 1−
(EN(µ,σ2)[θ|c ≤ θ]− c)(EN(µ,σ2)[θ|c ≤ θ]− µ)
σ2
≤ (EN(µ,σ2)[θ|c ≤ θ]− c
σ
)2, (53)
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for µ ≤ c. Moreover, the above variance is increasing in µ for µ ≤ c (see, e.g. [27]).
Let eµ¯ = EN(µ¯,σ2)[θ|bm ≤ θ]−bm and e0 = EN(0,σ2)[θ|bm ≤ θ]−bm. Then, from the increasing
property mentioned above, we find
(bm + eµ¯ − µ¯)eµ¯ ≤ (bm + e0)e0 ⇒
eµ¯ ≤ −(bm − µ¯) +
√
(bm − µ¯)2 + 4e0(bm + e0)
2
≤ −(bm − µ¯) +
√
(bm − µ¯)2 + 4x¯m(bm + x¯m)
2
, (54)
and hence,
eµ¯
x¯m
≤ 2(bm + x¯m)
(bm − µ¯) +
√
(bm − µ¯)2 + 4x¯m(bm + x¯m)
. (55)
Based on this inequality and that xQ1 > 11.5 (from the definition of M(σ) and that σ ≥ 300),
and that xQm > 6x
Q
1 and b
Q
m ≥ 12.5xQm for m ≥ 25, we can show that eµ¯ ≤ 1.134x¯m. Therefore,
E[aL(θ)|s, bm ≤ θ ≤ θc]−cm≤ξr¯Eφ¯[θ − bm|bm ≤ θ ≤ θc]
< ξr¯EN(µ¯,σ2)[θ − bm|bm ≤ θ] < 1.01× 1.134r¯x¯m < 0.75r¯x¯m+1. (56)
As for the variance, we start with
Var[aL(θ)|s, bm ≤ θ ≤ θc] ≤ξr¯2Varφ¯[θ|bm ≤ θ ≤ θc]≤ ξr¯2VarN(µ¯,σ2)[θ|bm≤θ]. (57)
Combining this with the bound in (53), we get
Var[aL(θ)|s, bm ≤ θ ≤ θc] ≤1.01× 1.1342r¯2x¯2m <1.3r¯2x¯2m. (58)
Similar results to the above can be derived for the case where aL(bm) ≤ s < aL(θc), using
θs instead of θc, where s = aL(θs) with bm ≤ θs < θc. The same for the case s < aL(bm),
following a similar argument with φ¯b ∼ N(µ¯b, ν¯2), where µ¯b = r¯σ2(r¯bm−δb)1+r¯2σ2 , ν¯2 = σ
2
1+r¯2σ2
, and
δb = aL(bm)− s > 0.
Now we bring into play the tail effect. For every θ ≥ θc, we use
Prob[θ|s]
Prob[cm ≤ θ′ ≤ θc|s] =
φ(s− aL(θ))φ( θσ )∫ θc
cm
φ(s− aL(θ′))φ( θ′σ )dθ′
, (59)
May 8, 2019 DRAFT
24
using which for s = cm + δ with 0 ≤ δ ≤ x¯m+1, we get
Prob[θ|s]
Prob[cm ≤ θ′ ≤ θc|s] ≤
e
δ2
2 φ( θ
σ
)
σ(Φ( θc
σ
)− Φ( cm
σ
))
. (60)
Therefore, for θ ≥ θc
Prob[θ|s, θ ≥ cm] ≤
e
δ2
2 (1− Φ( θc
σ
))
Φ( θc
σ
)− Φ( cm
σ
)
× φ(
θ
σ
)
σ(1− Φ( θc
σ
))
. (61)
Using the inequality h ≤ ρ(h) ≤ h2+1
h
for h > 0, we can show that 1−Φ(
θc
σ
)
Φ( θc
σ
)−Φ( cm
σ
)
≤ φ( θcσ )
φ( cm
σ
)
. This,
along with (61) and 0 ≤ δ ≤ x¯m+1 and θc = cm + σx¯m+1 yields
Prob[θ|s, θ ∈ Bm] ≤ Prob[θ|s, θ ≥ cm]
≤ e
− cmx¯m+1
σ φ( θ
σ
)
σ(1− Φ( θc
σ
))
≤ e
−σφ( θ
σ
)
σ(1− Φ( θc
σ
))
, (62)
for θ ≥ θc, where we have used cmx¯m+1 ≥ σ2 (which easily follows from Lemma 1). Using this
along with (56), we can obtain
E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bm]− cm
≤0.75r¯x¯m+1+e−σ(3rL(θc − cm + σ(ρ(θc
σ
)− θc
σ
)))
≤0.75r¯x¯m+1+3rLσe−σ(x¯m+1+ σ
cm+σx¯m+1
)≤r¯x¯m+1. (63)
Also, E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bm] ≥ aL(bm) ≥ cm− r¯x¯m. To bound the variance, let κ = E[aL(θ)|s, bm ≤
θ ≤ θc] (κ > aL(bm)). Then,
Var[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bm] ≤ E[(aL(θ)− κ)2|s, θ ∈ Bm]
≤ 1.3r¯2x¯2m + e−σEN(0,σ2)[(aL(θ)− aL(bm))2|θ ≥ θc]
≤ 1.3r¯2x¯2m + e−σEN(0,σ2)[(3rL(θ − cm) + r¯x¯m)2|θ ≥ θc]
≤ 1.3r¯2x¯2m + 9r¯2e−σ((σx¯m+1 + 1)2 + σ2)
≤ 0.75r¯2( x¯m + x¯m+1
2
)2, (64)
on noting σ ≥ 300.
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For s < cm−1, we use the fact that Var[θ|s, bm ≤ θ ≤ θc] ≤ ( θc−bm2 )2 to get
Var[aL(θ)|s, bm ≤ θ ≤ θc] ≤ r¯2(θc − bm
2
)2 < 0.3. (65)
As for the effect of θ > θc, we can easily see that for s < cm (62) becomes
Prob[θ|s, θ ∈ Bm] ≤
e−σ−
x¯2m+1
2 φ( θ
σ
)
σ(1− Φ( θc
σ
))
. (66)
We can use this to bound the variance similar to (64):
Var[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bm]≤
0.75r¯
2( x¯m+x¯m+1
2
)2, cm−1 ≤ s ≤ cm
1
3
, s < cm−1
(67)
For the case where s > cm + x¯m+1 (i.e., δ > x¯m+1), let θs = cm + σδ. Then, similar to (62)
we can obtain
Prob[θ|s, θ ∈ Bm] ≤
e−σφ( θ
σ
)
σ(1− Φ( θs
σ
))
, (68)
for θ ≥ θs. Using this and similar to (63), we can reach at
E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bm] < cm + 3rLσ(δ + 1). (69)
To bound the variance, similar to (64) we can show
Var[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bm] < 2.5r2Lσ2δ2, (70)
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 7. First, we use the properties of the base configuration listed in Lemma 1 to
show that
Prob[θ ∈ Bk−j]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk] ≤ e
2j+1. (71)
Let B˜k=[b˜k, b˜k+1]=[
cQk−1+c
Q
k
2
+3,
cQk +c
Q
k+1
2
], and B˜k−j=[b˜k−j, b˜k−j+1]=[
cQk−j−1+c
Q
k−j
2
−3, c
Q
k−j+c
Q
k−j+1
2
].
Then, it is straightforward to verify that
Prob[θ ∈ Bk−j]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk] ≤
Prob[θ ∈ B˜k−j]
Prob[θ ∈ B˜k]
. (72)
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Similar to part iii) of Lemma 1, we can write
Prob[θ ∈ B˜k−j]
Prob[θ ∈ B˜k]
≤ φ(
b˜k−j+1
σ
)
φ( b˜k+1+δ
σ
)
× b˜k+1 − b˜k + δ
b˜k+1 − b˜k
, (73)
where δ = max{0, (b˜k−j+1 − b˜k−j)− (b˜k+1 − b˜k)} ≤ 6. As a result,
Prob[θ ∈ Bk−j]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk] ≤
φ(
cQk−j+c
Q
k−j+1
2σ
)
φ(
cQk +c
Q
k+1+12
2σ
)
× x
Q
k+1 + x
Q
k − 3 + δ
xQk+1 + x
Q
k − 3
≤ 1.3e 1σ2 (cQm+3)(cQm−cQm−j+6), (74)
where we have used the fact that xQ1 > 11.5. Based on the above inequality, together with
cQm − cQm−j ≤ 2jxQm, and c
Q
mx
Q
m
σ2
≤ 1, and that cQm
σ
≤ 2√2 lnσ + 1.5 + 1.5 (which follows from
Lemma 1 and that m < σ as stated in Remark 1), and a bit of manipulation we can show that
Prob[θ∈Bk−j ]
Prob[θ∈Bk]
≤ e2j+1.
Now, to prove the lemma for k < m, we write
Prob[θ ∈ Bk−j|s]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk|s] ≤
Prob[θ ∈ Bk−j]φ(δ + (ck − ck−j)− r¯x¯m)
Prob[θ ∈ Bk]φ(δ + r¯x¯m)
≤ Prob[θ ∈ Bk−j]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk] e
− (ck−ck−j)
2
2
+r¯x¯m(ck−ck−j)−δ(ck−ck−j−2r¯x¯m)
≤ e−
(ck−ck−j)2
2
+2j+1+2jr¯x¯2m ≤ e−
(ck−ck−j)2
2
+3j+1, (75)
using r¯x¯2m <
1
2
(which follows from xQm < 0.262σ for m ≥ 25). The case k = m needs separate
treatment. Define Bˆm = [bm, cm+ x¯m]. Then, it is easy to verify that (71) still holds if we replace
Bm with Bˆm. Therefore, the proof in this case follows from an argument similar to above on
noting that Prob[θ ∈ Bˆm|s] ≤ Prob[θ ∈ Bm|s]. 
Proof of Lemma 8. If s ≥ ck + r¯x¯k+2, then
Prob[θ ∈ Bk|s]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk+1|s]≤
Prob[θ ∈ Bk]φ(mk+1 + δ − ck − r¯x¯k+2)
Prob[θ ∈ Bk+1]φ(mk+1 + δ − ck+1 − r¯x¯k+2)
≤ Prob[θ ∈ Bk]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk+1]e
∆k+1(
ck+ck+1
2
+r¯x¯k+2−δ)≤e∆k+1(r¯x¯k+2−δ), (76)
where the last inequality follows from the definition of mk+1. However, for the case where
s < ck + r¯x¯k+2, the upper bound on the likelihood Prob[s|θ ∈ Bk] in the first inequality may be
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less and hence is replaced by 1, which will thereby lead to
Prob[θ ∈ Bk|s]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk+1|s] ≤ e
∆k+1(r¯x¯k+2−δ)+
r¯2x¯2k+2
2 . (77)
The other side of the inequality can be proved similarly.
For the case k = m − 1, the lower bound φ(mk+1 + δ − ck+1 − r¯x¯k+2) for the likelihood
Prob[s|θ ∈ Bk+1] is not valid anymore. To fix this, as in Lemma 7, we use Bˆm = [bm, cm + x¯m]
instead of Bm to obtain,
Prob[θ ∈ Bm−1|s]
Prob[θ ∈ Bm|s] ≤
Prob[θ ∈ Bm−1|s]
Prob[θ ∈ Bˆm|s]
≤ Prob[θ ∈ Bm]
Prob[θ ∈ Bˆm]
e∆m(r¯x¯m−δ)+
r¯2x¯2m
2 . (78)
On the other hand, we can show that Prob[θ∈Bm]Prob[θ∈Bˆm] < 1.16, which completes the proof. It is easy
to see that the inequality in LHS stays as before for k = m− 1. 
Proof of Lemma 9. As the first step we bound the effect of intervals other than Bk ∪Bk+1. Let
η = E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bk ∪Bk+1] and ηj = E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bj] for −m ≤ j ≤ m. Using Lemma 7,
we can write
k+m∑
j=1
Prob[θ ∈ Bk−j|s]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk|s] (η − ηk−j)
≤
k+m∑
j=1
(ck − ck−j + 2x¯m + 2r¯x¯m)e−
(ck−ck−j)2
2
+3j+1
≤
k+m∑
j=1
(2j
¯
x1 + 2x¯m + 2r¯x¯m)e
−2j2
¯
x21+3j+1
≤4e−2¯x21+4x¯m
k+m∑
j=1
je−2(j
2−1)
¯
x21+3(j−1)
≤4e−2¯x21+4x¯m
∞∑
j=1
e−(j−1)
2 ≤5.6e
4
σ15
< 10−10r¯2
¯
x21, (79)
where we have used the identity
∑∞
j=0 e
−j2 ≈ 1.386. Similarly, we can bound the effect of
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non-neighboring intervals on the variance:
k+m∑
j=1
Prob[θ ∈ Bk−j|s]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk|s] (η − ηk−j)
2 ≤ 5.6e
4
σ14
. (80)
On the other hand,
k+m∑
j=1
Prob[θ ∈ Bk−j|s]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk|s] Var[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bk−j]
≤
k+m∑
j=1
1
3
e−
(ck−ck−j)2
2
+3j+1 ≤ 0.5e
4
σ16
. (81)
Combining the two, we obtain
m∑
j=−m
j/∈{k,k+1}
Prob[θ∈Bj|s]((η − ηj)2+Var[aL(θ)|s, θ∈Bj])≤10−10r¯2
¯
x21. (82)
Therefore, the effect of intervals other than Bk and Bk+1 on aF (s) (and its derivative given by
Var[aL|s]) is quite negligible. Now, focusing on these two intervals (i.e., Bk and Bk+1), we have
E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bk ∪Bk+1]
= pE[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bk] + (1− p)E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bk+1]
≤ p(ck + r¯x¯k+1) + (1− p)(ck + ∆k+1 + r¯x¯k+2)
≤ ck + (1− p)∆k+1 + r¯x¯k+2, (83)
where p = Prob[θ∈Bk|s]Prob[θ∈Bk∪Bk+1|s]
. The proof for the upper bound on aF (s) now follows from
Lemma 8. The proof for the lower bound on aF (s) is similar. Now, as for the derivative, we
first note that d
ds
aF (s) = Var[aL|s]. Again, focusing on Bk ∪Bk+1, we can write
Var[aL|s, θ ∈ Bk ∪Bk+1]
≤ pVar[aL|s, θ ∈ Bk] + (1− p)Var[aL|s, θ ∈ Bk+1]
+ p(1− p)(E[aL|s, θ ∈ Bk]− E[aL|s, θ ∈ Bk+1])2. (84)
The rest easily follows from Lemma 5 and Lemma 8. 
Proof of Lemma 10. Exploiting the term e−δ(cm−cm−r−2r¯σ) in (75) (for k = m), it is easy to
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observe that the same upper bounds given by (79) and (82) hold for the effect of intervals other
than Bm on aF (s) provided
e−δ(cm−cm−r−2r¯x¯m)(E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bm]− cm) < 2x¯m. (85)
Verifying the above inequality is quite straightforward using Lemma 6, and specially noting that
E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bm] − cm < 3rLσ(δ + 1) for δ > x¯m+1. The proof of the lemma is now an
immediate consequence of Lemma 6. 
Proof of Lemma 11. We start by showing that
J˜L(ck) =
∫ ∞
−∞
(aF (s)− ck)2φ(s− ck)ds ≤ 1.1r¯2x¯2k+2. (86)
Using the upper bound on aF (s) given in Corollary 1, we can write∫ mk+1
ck
(aF (s)− ck)2φ(s− ck)ds
≤
∫ mk+1−ck
0
(1.01r¯x¯k+2 + 1.17∆k+1e
−δ∆k+1)2φ(mk+1 − ck − δ)dδ. (87)
A useful inequality here is∫ Λ
0
e−δ∆φ(Λ− δ)dδ ≤ φ(Λ)
∫ Λ
0
e−δ(∆−Λ)dδ ≤ φ(Λ)
∆− Λ . (88)
Another useful property is that
∆k+1
2
+
2.3
∆k+1
≥ mk+1 − ck ≥ ∆k+1
2
− 1.1
∆k+1
≥
¯
xk. (89)
The proof of the RHS is similar to part iii) of Lemma 1:
Prob[θ|θ ∈ Bk+1]
Prob[θ|θ ∈ Bk] ≤
bk+2 − bk+1
bk+1 − bk ≤
0.5(ck+2 − ck) + 0.2rL
0.5(ck+1 − ck−1)− 0.2rL
≤ x
Q
k+2 + x
Q
k+1 + 3
xQk+1 + x
Q
k − 3
≤ e(1 + e)x
Q
k + 3
(1 + e)xQk − 3
. (90)
As a result,
mk+1 − ck ≥ ∆k+1
2
− ln
(
e(1 + e)xQk + 3
(1 + e)xQk − 3
)
1
∆k+1
≥ ∆k+1
2
− 1.1
∆k+1
≥
¯
xk, (91)
on noting that xQk ≥ 11.5 and ∆k+1 ≥ 17. This also implies that ∆k+1 ≤ 2∆mk+1 + 0.14, where
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we define ∆mk+1 = mk+1− ck. The LHS of (89) follows from an analysis similar to (74) for the
adjacent intervals of Bk and Bk+1:
Prob[θ ∈ Bk]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk+1] ≤ 1.3×
φ(
cQk−1+c
Q
k +6
2σ
)
φ(
cQk +c
Q
k+1
2σ
)
≤ 1.3e 12σ2 (2xQm−3)(2cQm+3) ≤ 1.3e2, (92)
from which the proof follows from the definition of mk+1.
Incorporating (88) and (89) into (87) and after some manipulation, we can find∫ mk+1
ck
(aF (s)− ck)2φ(s− ck)ds ≤
1.012r¯2x¯2k+2
2
+
(
1.37(2∆mk+1 + 0.14)
2
2(2∆mk+1 + 0.14)−∆mk+1
+
2.37r¯x¯k+2(2∆
m
k+1 + 0.14)
(2∆mk+1 + 0.14)−∆mk+1
)
φ(∆mk+1)
≤ 1.01
2r¯2x¯2k+2
2
+
(
1.37(2∆mk+1 + 0.14)
1.5
+
2.37r¯x¯k+2
0.5
)
φ(∆mk+1)
≤ 1.01
2r¯2x¯2k+2
2
+
(
1.37(2
¯
x1 + 0.14)
1.5
+ 4.74r¯x¯k+2
)
φ(
¯
x1)
≤ 1.01
2r¯2x¯2k+2
2
+ (1.83
¯
x1 + 0.1 + 4.74r¯x¯k+2)φ(
¯
x1)
≤ 1.01
2r¯2x¯2k+2
2
+
2
¯
x1e
−2(
¯
x1−2)
√
2pie4σ4
, (93)
where we have also used
¯
xk ≥
¯
x1 ≥ 2
√
2 lnσ + 2.
For s ∈ [mk+1, ck+1], we have aF (s) ≤ ck+1 + 1.1r¯x¯k+2 according to Corollary 2. Therefore,∫ ck+1
mk+1
(aF (s)−ck)2φ(s−ck)ds≤ (∆k+1 + 1.1r¯x¯k+2)2Φ(ck−mk+1)
≤ (2∆mk+1 + 0.14 + 1.1r¯x¯k+2)2
φ(∆mk+1)
∆mk+1
≤(2
¯
x1+ 0.14 +1.1r¯x¯k+2)
2φ(¯
x1)
¯
x1
≤5¯x1e
−2(
¯
x1−2)
√
2pie4σ4
. (94)
Using aF (s) ≤ s+ 1.1x¯m, we can show∫ ∞
ck+1
(aF (s)− ck)2φ(s− ck)ds≤
√
2pi
2
φ(2
¯
x1)(1.1x¯m+2
¯
x1+1)
2
≤
√
2pi
2
φ(4
√
2 lnσ)(1.1x¯m +
¯
x1 + 1)
2 ≤ (1.1x¯m + ¯x1 + 1)
2
2σ16
< 10−4r¯2x¯2k+2. (95)
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Combining (93), (94), and (95), we can arrive at∫ ∞
−∞
(aF (s)− ck)2φ(s− ck)ds≤ 1.012r¯2x¯2k+2+ 2× 10−4r¯2x¯2k+2+
14
¯
x1e
−2(
¯
x1−2)
√
2pie4σ4
≤ 1.1r¯2x¯2k+2. (96)
For the case of k = m,
∫∞
cm
(aF (s)− cm)2φ(s− cm)ds needs a different treatment. First we note
that ∫ ∞
cm+x¯m+1
(aF (s)− cm)2φ(s− cm)ds≤
∫ ∞
x¯m+1
9r2Lσ
2(δ + 1)2φ(δ)dδ
≤ 9r2Lσ2φ(x¯m+1)
(x¯m+1 + 2)
2
2
< 10−4r¯2x¯2m+1. (97)
Also, ∫ cm+x¯m+1
cm
(aF (s)− cm)2φ(s− cm)ds<0.5r¯2x¯2m+1, (98)
using which it is straightforward to verify that (86) holds for k = m as well (define x¯m+2 = x¯m+1
for consistency).
Let θ = ck + , with 0 ≤  ≤ ∆k+12 . We first show that a˜L(θ) lies in a 5r¯x¯k+2-vicinity of
either ck or ck+1. We begin with the case where a˜L(θ) ∈ [ck, ck+1]. Let a˜L(θ) = ck + ′, with
5r¯x¯k+2 ≤ ′ ≤ ∆k+1 − 5r¯x¯k+2. We can use Corollary 2 to obtain a lower bound for J˜L(a˜L):
J˜(a˜L)≥(′−1.1r¯x¯k+2)2(1−Φ(4
√
2 lnσ
5
))≥5(
′− 1.1r¯x¯k+2)2
16
√
pi lnσσ
16
25
, (99)
where the last inequality follows from the property that 1− Φ(x) ≥ xφ(x)
1+x2
. Putting this together
with u˜L(θ, a˜L) ≥ u˜L(θ, ck) ≥ −rL(∆k+12 )2 − 1.1(1 − rL)r¯2x¯2k+2, it is easy to show that ′ −
1.1r¯x¯k+2 <
∆k+1√
σ
for σ ≥ 300. A second use of Corollary 2 now yields J˜L(a˜L) ≥ (′ −
1.1r¯x¯k+2)
2Φ(∆k+1
4
) ≥ 0.99(′ − 1.1r¯x¯k+2)2 noting ∆k+1 ≥ 2
¯
x1 > 17. Therefore,
u˜L(θ, a˜L) ≤ −rL(′ − )2 − 0.99(′ − 1.1r¯x¯k+2)2. (100)
On the other hand, using (86), we get u˜L(θ, ck) ≥ −rL2−0.99(1−rL)(1.1r¯x¯k+2)2. The RHS in
(100) is maximized for ∗ = rL+0.99(1−rL)×1.1r¯x¯k+2
rL+0.99(1−rL) . Having u˜L(θ, a˜L) ≥ u˜L(θ, ck) requires that
|′ − ∗| < |0 − ∗|, that is, ′ ≤ 2∗ (recall the assumption by contradiction that 5r¯x¯k+2 ≤ ′).
This then requires ′ < 5r¯x¯k+2.
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For the case a˜L(θ) /∈ [ck, ck+1], suppose a˜L(θ) < ck (the other case is similar), and let a˜L(θ) =
ck−′. Then, it follows from u˜L(θ, a˜L) ≥ u˜L(θ, ck) that −rL2−1.1(1−rL)r¯2x¯2k+2 ≤ −rL(+′)2,
from which it easily follows that ′ < 1.1. Now an argument similar to the case a˜L(θ) ∈ [ck, ck+1]
shows that J˜L(a˜L) ≥ 0.99(′−1.1r¯x¯k+2)2. Combining this with |θ−ck| < |θ−a˜L| and u˜L(θ, a˜L) ≥
u˜L(θ, ck), we get 1.1r¯2x¯2k+2 > 0.99(
′ − 1.1r¯x¯k+2)2 resulting in ′ < 2.5r¯x¯k+2.
Similar to Lemma 7 in [1], we can show that a˜L(θ) is increasing. The fact that a˜L(θ) is
increasing implies that it cannot swing between the two neighborhoods. Therefore, there exists a
unique b˜k+1 separating the two regimes of [ck− 5r¯x¯k+2, ck + 5r¯x¯k+2] and [ck+1− 5r¯x¯k+2, ck+1 +
5r¯x¯k+2], thus completing the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 12. We start by
d
daL
∫ ∞
−∞
(aF (s)− aL)2φ(s− aL)ds
=
d
daL
∫ ∞
−∞
(aF (s+ aL)− aL)2φ(s)ds
= 2
∫ ∞
−∞
(aL − aF (s+ aL))(1− d
ds
aF (s+ aL))φ(s)ds
= 2
∫ ∞
−∞
(aL − aF (s))(1− d
ds
aF (s))φ(s− aL)ds. (101)
Changing the order of differentiation and integration requires the map aL 7→ (aF (s+ aL)− aL)2
to be (i) continuously differentiable, and (ii) its partial derivative be bounded by an integrable
function in an open interval around aL.14 These are easy to verify, noting that the follower’s
strategy aF (s) (i) is analytic, from which the continuity of partial derivatives is immediate, and
(ii) |aF (s)| < |s|+σ and | ddsaF (s)| < s2 + c2m, from which integrability of the partial derivatives
follows from the finiteness of the moments of normal distribution. We can similarly, verify the
following identity derived using the integration by part for any given aL ∈ R:∫ ∞
−∞
(aL − aF (s))(s− aL)φ(s− aL)ds = −
∫ ∞
−∞
(aL − aF (s))dφ(s− aL)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(s− aL)d(aL − aF (s)) = −
∫ ∞
−∞
d
ds
aF (s)φ(s− aL)ds. (102)
14See, e.g., Proposition 14.2.2 in [28].
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Using (30), the first order condition for the optimal leader’s response a˜L gives
rL(a˜L − θ) + (1− rL)
∫ ∞
−∞
(a˜L − aF (s))(1− d
ds
aF (s))φ(s− a˜L)ds = 0. (103)
Define the real analytic function Θ : R→ R as
Θ(x) = x+
(1− rL)
rL
∫ ∞
−∞
(x− aF (s))(1− d
ds
aF (s))φ(s− x)ds. (104)
From (103) it then follows that Θ(·) is the left inverse of the leader’s best response strategy
a˜L(·), that is, Θ(a˜L(θ)) = θ for all θ ∈ R.
Differentiating Θ(x) we get
rL
d
dx
Θ(x) = rL +(1− rL)
∫ ∞
−∞
(1− d
ds
aF (s))φ(s− x)ds
+(1− rL)
∫ ∞
−∞
(x− aF (s))(1− d
ds
aF (s))(s−x)φ(s−x)ds
= rL +(1− rL)
(
1−
∫ ∞
−∞
(2 + (x− aF (s))(s−x))d
ds
aF (s)φ(s−x)ds
)
, (105)
where the last equality is obtained using (102). Next, we use (105) to bound d
dx
Θ(x) for x =
a˜L ∈ [ck − 5r¯x¯k+2, ck + 5r¯x¯k+2].
Using (24) to bound d
ds
aF (s) and then applying (88), we can obtain∫ mk+1
a˜L
(
d
ds
aF (s)− 1.01r¯2x¯2k+2)φ(s− a˜L)ds
≤ 1.17∆2k+1
∫ mk+1−a˜L
0
e−∆k+1δφ(mk+1 − a˜L − δ)dδ
≤ 1.17∆
2
k+1φ(mk+1 − a˜L)
∆k+1 −mk+1 + a˜L . (106)
Another useful inequality similar to (88) is∫ Λ
0
e−δ∆φ(Λ + δ)dδ ≤ φ(Λ)
∆ + Λ
, (107)
which together with the bound on d
ds
aF (s) given in (24) yields∫ ck+1
mk+1
(
d
ds
aF (s)− 1.01r¯2x¯2k+2)φ(s− a˜L)ds
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≤ 1.17∆2k+1
∫ ck+1−mk+1
0
e−∆k+1δφ(mk+1 − a˜L + δ)dδ
≤ 1.17∆
2
k+1φ(mk+1 − a˜L)
∆k+1 +mk+1 − a˜L . (108)
Let ∆Lk+1 = mk+1− a˜L. Then, using (91), we can show that for a˜L ∈ [ck−5r¯x¯k+2, ck + 5r¯x¯k+2],
∆Lk+1 ≥ ¯xk. Also, ∆k+1 ≤ 2∆
L
k+1 + 0.14. This, together with (106) and (108), yields∫ ck+1
a˜L
(
d
ds
aF (s)− 1.01r¯2x¯2k+2)φ(s− a˜L)ds
≤ 2.34∆
3
k+1φ(mk+1 − a˜L)
∆2k+1 − (mk+1 − a˜L)2
≤ 2.34(2∆
L
k+1 + 0.14)
3φ(∆Lk+1)
(2∆Lk+1 + 0.14)
2 − (∆Lk+1)2
≤ 2.34(2¯x1 + 0.14)
3φ(
¯
x1)
(2
¯
x1 + 0.14)2 −
¯
x21
≤ (6.24
¯
x1 + 1)φ(
¯
x1) ≤ (6.24¯x1 + 1)e
−2(
¯
x1−2)
√
2pie4σ4
, (109)
where we have again used
¯
x1 ≥ 2
√
2 lnσ + 2. On the other hand,∫ cm+x¯m+1
ck+1
(
d
ds
aF (s)− 1.01r¯2x¯2k+2)φ(s− a˜L)ds
≤
(1
4
(∆m+1 + 2r¯x¯m+1)
2 + 0.01r¯2x¯2m+1 − 1.01r¯2x¯2k+2
)φ(ck+1 − a˜L)
ck+1 − a˜L
≤ x¯2m+1((1 + r¯)2 + 0.01r¯2)
φ(2
¯
x1)
2
¯
x1
≤ x¯
2
m+1((1 + r¯)
2 + 0.01r¯2)
2
√
2piσ16
¯
x1
. (110)
Combining the two, we get∫ cm+x¯m+1
ck
(
d
ds
aF (s)− 1.01r¯2x¯2k+2)φ(s− a˜L)ds
<
(6.24
¯
x1 + 1)e
−2(
¯
x1−2)
√
2pie4σ4
+
x¯2m+1((1 + r¯)
2 + 0.01r¯2)
2
√
2piσ16
¯
x1
< 0.01r¯2x¯2k+2, (111)
noting that σ ≥ 300.
For s > cm + x¯m+1, using Lemma 10 and the fact that a˜L(θ) ≤ a˜L(cm) < cm + 5rLσ, and
similar machinery to the above, we get∫ ∞
cm+x¯m+1
d
ds
aF (s)φ(s− a˜L)ds
≤ 3r2Lσ2
∫ ∞
0
(δ + x¯m+1)
2φ(δ + x¯m+1 − 5rLx¯m+1)dδ
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≤3
√
2pi
2
rL(x¯m+1+1)
2φ(x¯m+1−5rLx¯m+1)<10−4r¯2x¯2k+2. (112)
This, along with (111) yields∫ ∞
−∞
d
ds
aF (s)φ(s− a˜L)ds < 1.05r¯2x¯2k+2. (113)
The case k = m is even easier on noting that d
ds
aF (s) ≤ 0.8r¯2x¯2m+1 over the whole interval
s ∈ [cm, cm + x¯m+1].
Now, to bound the other term assume aF (a˜L) ≤ a˜L (the other case is similar). From (9), we
can see
aF (mk+1) ≥ ck + ∆k+1
2.17
− 1.01r¯x¯k+2 > ck + 5r¯x¯k+2 > a˜L. (114)
Using this, together with a˜L − aF (a˜L) ≤ 5r¯x¯k+2 + 1.1r¯x¯k+2 < 6.1r¯x¯k+2, we get∫ ∞
−∞
d
ds
aF (s)(a˜L − aF (s))(s− a˜L)φ(s− a˜L)ds
≤ (a˜L − aF (a˜L))
∫ mk+1
a˜L
d
ds
aF (s)(s− a˜L)φ(s− a˜L)ds
≤ 6.1r¯x¯k+2
(
1.01r¯2x¯2k+2√
2pi
+ (mk+1 − a˜L)
∫ mk+1
a˜L
(
d
ds
aF (s)− 1.01r¯2x¯2k+2)φ(s− a˜L)ds
)
≤ 6.1r¯x¯k+2
(
1.01r¯2x¯2k+2√
2pi
+
1.17∆2k+1(mk+1 − a˜L)φ(mk+1 − a˜L)
∆k+1 −mk+1 + a˜L
)
≤ 6.1r¯x¯k+2
(
1.01r¯2x¯2k+2√
2pi
+ 1.17(2
¯
x1 + 0.14)
2φ(
¯
x1)
)
< 2.46r¯3x¯3k+2 +
7.15r¯x¯k+2(2
¯
x1 + 0.14)
2e−2(¯x1−2)√
2pie4σ4
< 0.1r¯2x¯2k+2, (115)
for σ ≥ 300. For the case k = m and aF (a˜L) ≤ a˜L,∫ ∞
−∞
d
ds
aF (s)(a˜L − aF (s))(s− a˜L)φ(s− a˜L)ds
≤(a˜L − aF (a˜L))
∫ ∞
a˜L
d
ds
aF (s)(s− a˜L)φ(s− a˜L)ds. (116)
We break this into two parts. First, using an approach similar to (112), we can obtain∫ ∞
cm+x¯m+1
d
ds
aF (s)(s− a˜L)φ(s− a˜L)ds < 10−4r¯2x¯2m+1. (117)
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The other part is
∫ cm+x¯m+1
a˜L
d
ds
aF (s)(s− a˜L)φ(s− a˜L)ds. If a˜L ≥ cm, then∫ cm+x¯m+1
a˜L
d
ds
aF (s)(s− a˜L)φ(s− a˜L)ds≤0.8r¯
2x¯2m+1√
2pi
, (118)
where we have used that d
ds
aF (s) ≤ 0.8r¯2x¯2m+1 for s ∈ [cm, cm+ x¯m+1] according to Lemma 10.
Hence we get ∫ ∞
−∞
d
ds
aF (s)(a˜L − aF (s))(s− a˜L)φ(s− a˜L)ds
≤ 6.1r¯x¯m+1(0.32r¯2x¯2m+1 + 10−4r¯2x¯2m+1) < 0.1r¯2x¯2m+1. (119)
We need to revise (118) when a˜L < cm. On one hand a˜L − aF (a˜L) < cm − aF (a˜L) < 1.1r¯x¯m+1
(instead of 6.1r¯x¯m+1). We also use a loose bound such as15∫ cm+x¯m+1
a˜L
d
ds
aF (s)(s− a˜L)φ(s− a˜L)ds≤1.1r¯
2x¯2m+1√
2pi
, (120)
in order to get ∫ ∞
−∞
d
ds
aF (s)(a˜L − aF (s))(s− a˜L)φ(s− a˜L)ds
≤ 1.1r¯x¯m+1(1.1r¯
2x¯2m+1√
2pi
+ 10−4r¯2x¯2m+1) < 0.1r¯
2x¯2m+1. (121)
Finally, putting all together we get∫ ∞
−∞
d
ds
aF (s)(2 + (a˜L − aF (s))(s− a˜L))φ(s− a˜L)ds
< (2× 1.05 + 0.1)r¯2x¯2m+1 < 2.2er¯2x¯2m < 0.45r¯2σ2, (122)
where we use that x¯m < 0.272σ for m ≥ 25 and σ ≥ 300.
Now for the other side, on noting that aF (s) ≤ s+1.1x¯m+1 and that for s ∈ [ck+1, cm+ x¯m+1]
we have d
ds
aF (s) ≤ ((1 + r¯)2 + 1.01r¯2)x¯2m+1, we can write∫ cm+x¯m+1
ck+1
d
ds
aF (s)((aF (s)− a˜L)(s− a˜L)− 2)φ(s− a˜L)ds
<((1 + r¯)2 + 1.01r¯2)x¯2m+1
∫ ∞
ck+1
(s+ 1.1x¯m+1 − a˜L)(s− a˜L)φ(s− a˜L)ds
15Note that a˜L > aF (a˜L) > cm − 1.01r¯x¯m+1.
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<
√
2pi((1 + r¯)2 + 1.01r¯2)x¯2m+1φ(ck+1 − a˜L)
∫ ∞
0
(δ + ck+1 − a˜L + 1.1x¯m+1)(δ + ck+1 − a˜L)φ(δ)dδ
<
√
2pi((1+r¯)2+1.01r¯2)x¯2m+1φ(ck+1 − a˜L)
(
1+(ck+1−a˜L)(ck+1−a˜L+1.1x¯m+1)
2
+
2(ck+1−a˜L)+1.1x¯m+1√
2pi
)
<
√
2pi((1 + r¯)2 + 1.01r¯2)x¯2m+1φ(2¯
x1)
(
1 + 2
¯
x1(2
¯
x1 + 1.1x¯m+1)
2
+
4
¯
x1 + 1.1x¯m+1√
2pi
)
<10x¯4m+1φ(4
√
2 lnσ) < 10−4r¯2x¯2m+1. (123)
For s ≥ cm + x¯m+1, aF (s) ≤ cm + 3rLσ(s − cm + 1) < s, and ddsaF (s) ≤ 3rL(s − cm)2. An
approach similar to (112) leads to∫ ∞
cm+x¯m+1
d
ds
aF (s)((aF (s)− a˜L)(s− a˜L)− 2)φ(s− a˜L)ds <10−4r¯2x¯2m+1. (124)
If ck ≤ s ≤ mk+1 − 2 lnσ∆k+1 , then, according to Corollary 1,
aF (s) < ck + 1.17
∆k+1
σ2
+ 1.01r¯x¯k+2 < ck + 2.34rL∆k+1 + 1.01r¯x¯k+2 < ck + 5.8r¯x¯k+2. (125)
Therefore, (aF (s)− a˜L)(s− a˜L) < 11r¯x¯2k+2 < 2. On the other hand, it is easy to find∫ ck+1
mk+1− 2 lnσ∆k+1
d
ds
aF (s)((aF (s)−a˜L)(s−a˜L)−2)φ(s−a˜L)ds
≤
(
(
∆k+1
2
+ r¯x¯k+2)
2 + 0.01r¯2x¯2k+2
)
∆k+1φ(mk+1 − a˜L − 2 lnσ
∆k+1
). (126)
Let ∆Lk+1 = mk+1 − a˜L. Then, from the above inequality (and similar to (109)) we can get∫ ck+1
mk+1− 2 lnσ∆k+1
d
ds
aF (s)((aF (s)−a˜L)(s−a˜L)−2)φ(s−a˜L)ds
≤ ((∆Lk+1 + 0.07 + r¯x¯k+2)2 + 0.01r¯2x¯2k+2)(2∆Lk+1 + 0.14)φ(∆Lk+1 −
2 lnσ
∆k+1
)
≤ ((
¯
x1 + 0.07 + r¯x¯k+2)
2 + 0.01r¯2x¯2k+2)(2¯
x1 + 0.14)φ(
¯
x1 − 2 lnσ
4
√
2 lnσ
)
≤2(
¯
x1 + 0.1)
3φ(
¯
x1 −2
√
2 lnσ
8
) ≤2(2
√
2 lnσ + 2.1)3φ(2
√
2 lnσ + 2−2
√
2 lnσ
8
)
≤54 lnσ
√
lnσe−
14
8
(
¯
x1−2)
√
2pie4σ3
<0.15r¯2σ2, (127)
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for σ ≥ 300. Overall, we arrive at∫ +∞
−∞
d
ds
aF (s)((aF (s)− a˜L)(s− a˜L)− 2)φ(s− a˜L)ds<0.4r¯2σ2. (128)
Similar argument holds for k = m.
It follows from the above analysis that
rL +(1− rL)(1− 0.45r¯2σ2) ≤ rL d
dx
Θ(x) ≤ rL +(1− rL)(1 + 0.4r¯2σ2), (129)
for x ∈ [ck − 5r¯x¯k+2, ck + 5r¯x¯k+2], where Θ(x) defined in (104) is the real analytic left-inverse
of the leader’s best response strategy a˜L(θ), that is, Θ(a˜L(θ)) = θ for all θ ∈ R. Moreover,
a˜L(θ) is an increasing function, as already discussed in the proof of the previous lemma.
We next claim that a˜L(θ) is continuous over both (ck, b˜k+1) and (b˜k+1, ck+1). Consider θ ∈
(ck, b˜k+1). From Lemma 11, we know that a˜L(θ) ∈ [ck − 5r¯x¯k+2, ck + 5r¯x¯k+2]. This is a tiny
interval around a fixed point of the leader’s original strategy aL(θ) (according to which the
follower’s best response aF (s) is derived). We next show that leader’s utility u˜L(θ, aL) given
in (27) is strongly concave (in aL) over this interval. The good news is that we have already
bounded ∂
2
∂a2L
u˜L(θ, aL) for aL ∈ [ck−5r¯x¯k+2, ck+5r¯x¯k+2] while bounding the derivative of Θ(x)
over this interval. In fact, from the definition of both functions given in (27) and (104), it is
easy to verify that
∂2
∂a2L
u˜L(θ, aL) = −2rL d
dx
Θ(x)|x=aL . (130)
Strong concavity of u˜L(θ, aL) for aL ∈ [ck−5r¯x¯k+2, ck+5r¯x¯k+2] then follows from (129). Recall
that for θ ∈ (ck, b˜k+1), leader’s best response a˜L(θ) ∈ [ck − 5r¯x¯k+2, ck + 5r¯x¯k+2], meaning that
a˜L(θ) is the unique maximizer of u˜L(θ, aL) over [ck − 5r¯x¯k+2, ck + 5r¯x¯k+2]. This uniqueness
property implies the continuity of a˜L(θ) over θ ∈ (ck, b˜k+1), noting that both left and right limits
of a˜L(θ) are maximizers of leader’s utility over [ck − 5r¯x¯k+2, ck + 5r¯x¯k+2], and hence have to
be identical.
Therefore, leader’s best response a˜L(θ) is continuous over both (ck, b˜k+1) and (b˜k+1, ck+1),
with its graph coinciding its analytic left inverse Θ(x) over both intervals. We can thus use (129)
to bound its derivative over each of these intervals, hence completing the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 13. We have already calculated the second derivative of J˜L when deriving the
May 8, 2019 DRAFT
39
partial derivative in (105). The same argument implies d
2
da2L
J˜L(aL) ≥ 2(1 − 0.45r¯2σ2) for aL ∈
[ck−5r¯x¯k+2, ck+5r¯x¯k+2]. This, implies that J˜L is strongly convex over [ck−5r¯x¯k+2, ck+5r¯x¯k+2].
It’s unique minimizer c˜k minimizes both losses in the leader’s payoff, hence it is the fixed point
of a˜L(θ), that is a˜L(c˜k) = c˜k. 
Proof of Lemma 14. The case b˜m < θ ≤ cm follows from Lemma 12, so we only need to consider
θ > cm. As the first step, we derive some useful lower bounds on J˜L(aL) for aL = cm +  with
 ≥ 0. In particular, we claim that for  > r¯x¯m+1 and σ ≥ 300, we have
J˜L(aL) ≥ 0.99(− r¯x¯m+1)2. (131)
We consider two cases: If  ≤ 3
4
x¯m+1, then aF (s)− cm ≤ r¯x¯m+1 for s ≤ aL+ 14 x¯m+1, and hence
J˜L(aL) ≥ (− r¯x¯m+1)2Φ( x¯m+14 ). If  > 34 x¯m+1, then aL−aF (aL + x¯m+14 − 1) ≥ (1− 4rLσ), and
hence J˜L(aL) ≥ (1 − 4rLσ)2Φ( x¯m+14 − 1)2. These two observations result in the lower bound
in (131) noting σ ≥ 300.
Consider now θ = cm+δ, 0 ≤ δ. We claim that a˜L(θ) < cm+2.2rL(δ+x¯m+1). Let a˜L = cm+.
Then,
u˜L(θ, a˜L) ≤ −rL(− δ)2 − 0.99(1− rL)(− r¯x¯m+1)2. (132)
Using an approach similar to Lemma 11, we can show that  < 2∗ where
∗ =
rLδ + 0.99(1− rL)r¯x¯m+1
rL + 0.99(1− rL) , (133)
from which we easily get  < 2.02rL(δ+ x¯m+1). Using this, the proof of the second part of the
lemma is quite straightforward.
As for d
dθ
a˜L(θ), the case a˜L(θ) ≤ cm + 5r¯x¯m+1 is covered in Lemma 12. Hence, we study the
case a˜L(θ) > cm + 5r¯x¯m+1. Noting that
a˜L(θ)− cm ≤ 2.2rL(σx¯m+1 + 5r¯x¯m+1 + x¯m+1) < 2.4, (134)
and similar to (112), we can obtain∫ ∞
cm+x¯m+1
d
ds
aF (s)φ(s− a˜L)ds < 10−4r¯2x¯2m+1. (135)
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Also, ∫ cm+x¯m+1
cm
d
ds
aF (s)φ(s− a˜L)ds ≤ 0.8r¯2x¯2m+1Φ(a˜L − cm). (136)
On the other hand, similar to (111), we have∫ cm
−∞
d
ds
aF (s)φ(s− a˜L)ds < 10−4r¯2x¯2m+1 + 1.01r¯2x¯2m+1Φ(cm − a˜L). (137)
Therefore, ∫ ∞
−∞
d
ds
aF (s)φ(s− a˜L)ds < 0.91r¯2x¯2m+1 < 2.48r¯2x¯2m, (138)
since x¯m+1 =
√
ex¯m.
To bound the other term, using a˜L−aF (s) < 2.2rL(σx¯m+1 + x¯m+1 + 5rLσ) + 1.5r¯x¯m+1 < 2.5
for s ≥ cm + x¯m+1 and similar to (112), we can show that∫ ∞
cm+x¯m+1
d
ds
aF (s)(a˜L − aF (s))(s−a˜L)φ(s−a˜L)ds<10−4r¯2x¯2m+1. (139)
For s ≤ cm + x¯m+1, we have aF (s) < a˜L. Therefore,∫ cm+x¯m+1
−∞
d
ds
aF (s)(a˜L − aF (s))(s− a˜L)φ(s− a˜L)ds
≤
∫ cm+x¯m+1
a˜L
d
ds
aF (s)(a˜L − aF (s))(s− a˜L)φ(s− a˜L)ds
≤ 1√
2pi
(r¯σx¯m+1 + 1.01r¯x¯m+1)× 0.8r¯2( x¯m + x¯m+1
2
)2 < 0.26r¯2x¯2m. (140)
Putting all together, we get∫ ∞
−∞
d
ds
aF (s)(2 + (a˜L − aF (s))(s− a˜L))φ(s− a˜L)ds < 5.22r¯2x¯2m < 0.4r¯2σ2, (141)
since x¯m < 0.272σ for m ≥ 25 and σ ≥ 300.
For the other side, similar to (123), (124), and (126), we have∫ cm−1
−∞
d
ds
aF (s)((aF (s)−a˜L)(s−a˜L)− 2)φ(s− a˜L)ds < 10−4r¯2x¯2m+1,∫ ∞
cm+x¯m+1
d
ds
aF (s)((aF (s)− a˜L)(s− a˜L)− 2)φ(s− a˜L)ds < 10−4r¯2x¯2m+1,∫ mm+√lnσ
cm−1
d
ds
aF (s)((aF (s)− a˜L)(s− a˜L)− 2)φ(s− a˜L)ds < 0.1r¯2σ2. (142)
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Also, same as (123),∫ cm−1
−∞
d
ds
aF (s)((aF (s)−a˜L)(s−a˜L)− 2)φ(s− a˜L)ds < 10−4r¯2x¯2m+1. (143)
Consider now s ∈ [mm +
√
lnσ, cm + x¯m+1]. It is easy to verify that (aF (s) − a˜L)(s − a˜L) <
2 for s ∈ [a˜L, cm + x¯m+1]. On the other hand, using Lemma 9 and 10, we can verify that
d
ds
aF (s) ≤ 1.1r¯2x¯2m+1 for s ∈ [mm +
√
lnσ, a˜L]. Moreover, it follows from Corollary 2 that
aF (s) ≥ cm−1.1r¯x¯m+1 for s ∈ [mm+
√
lnσ, a˜L], implying that a˜L−aF (s) < 2.4+1.1r¯x¯m+1 <
2.5 (see (134)). This yields∫ a˜L
mm+
√
lnσ
d
ds
aF (s)((aF (s)− a˜L)(s− a˜L)− 2)φ(s− a˜L)ds
< 2.5× 1.1r¯2x¯2m+1
∫ a˜L
mm+
√
lnσ
(a˜L − s)φ(s− a˜L)ds
<
2.5× 1.1r¯2x¯2m+1√
2pi
< 1.1r¯2x¯2m+1. (144)
From the above analysis it follows that∫ ∞
−∞
d
ds
aF (s)((aF (s)− aL)(s− aL)− 2)φ(s− aL)ds
< 0.1r¯2σ2 + 1.2r¯2x¯2m+1 < (0.1 + 1.2× e× 0.2722)r¯2σ2 < 0.4r¯2σ2. (145)
Using this and (141), and following exact same steps as in the proof of Lemma 12, we can show
that
¯
r ≤ d
dθ
a˜L(θ) ≤ r¯. 
Proof of Lemma 15. We start by finding an upper bound for J˜L(c˜k). We use J˜L(c˜k) ≤ J˜L(sk),
where we recall that aF (sk) = sk. Noting that the upper bound on the derivative of aF (s) in
(24) is increasing for sk ≤ s ≤ mk+1, we can write∫ mk+1
sk
(aF (s)− sk)2φ(s− sk)ds =
∫ mk+1
sk
(aF (s)− aF (sk))2φ(s− sk)ds ≤∫ mk+1
sk
(s− sk)2(1.17e−∆k+1(mk+1−s)∆2k+1 + 1.01r¯2x¯2k+2)2φ(s− sk)ds. (146)
Following a similar machinery as the one already used in, e.g., (109), we can arrive at∫ mk+1
sk
(aF (s)− aF (sk))2φ(s− sk)ds ≤
1.012r¯4x¯4k+2
2
May 8, 2019 DRAFT
42
+ 2.4r¯2x¯2k+2∆
2
k+1
(mk+1 − sk)2φ(mk+1 − sk)
∆k+1 −mk+1 + sk
+ 1.37∆4k+1
(mk+1 − sk)2φ(mk+1 − sk)
2∆k+1 −mk+1 + sk
≤1.01
2r¯4x¯4k+2
2
+ (9.6r¯2x¯2k+2¯
x21(¯
x1 + 0.07) + 7.31
¯
x21(¯
x1 + 0.07)
3)φ(
¯
x1)
<
7.5
¯
x51e
−2(
¯
x1−2)
√
2pie4σ4
, (147)
where the last inequality follows from
¯
x1 ≥ 2
√
2 lnσ + 2. Similarly, using (25) and Lemma 10
we can show that ∫ ∞
mk+1
(aF (s)− sk)2φ(s− sk)ds < 2¯x
5
1e
−2(
¯
x1−2)
√
2pie4σ4
. (148)
These two yield J˜L(sk) <
9.5
¯
x51e
−2(
¯
x1−2)√
2pie4σ4
< 0.2r2L using ¯
x1 > 8.75 for σ ≥ 300. It is easy to
verify that the same hold when k = m. The analysis in this case is even simpler on noting that
d
ds
aF (s) ≤ 0.8r¯2x¯2m+1 over the whole interval s ∈ [cm, cm + x¯m+1].
Applying the Envelope’s theorem to (27), we get
d
dθ
u˜L(θ, a˜L(θ)) = 2rL(θ − a˜L(θ)). (149)
Integrating this, along the inequality below
¯
rθ + (1−
¯
r)c˜k ≤ a˜L(θ) ≤ r¯θ + (1− r¯)c˜k, (150)
we get
rL(1− r¯)(θ − c˜k)2 ≤ u˜L(θ, ·)− u˜L(c˜k, ·) ≤ rL(1−
¯
r)(θ − c˜k)2, (151)
where we use u˜L(θ, ·) as a short-note for u˜L(θ, a˜L(θ)). Now, we note that at the endpoint
θ = b˜k+1, the above should also hold for c˜k+1. that is,
rL(1− r¯)(b˜k+1 − c˜k)2 ≤ u˜L(b˜k+1, ·)− u˜L(c˜k, ·) ≤ rL(1−
¯
r)(b˜k+1 − c˜k)2
rL(1− r¯)(b˜k+1 − c˜k+1)2 ≤ u˜L(b˜k+1, ·)− u˜L(c˜k+1, ·) ≤ rL(1−
¯
r)(b˜k+1 − c˜k+1)2. (152)
Using this and noting 0 < u˜L(c˜k, ·) < 0.2r2L and 0 < u˜L(c˜k+1, ·) < 0.2r2L, we can arrive at
(1−rL)|(b˜k+1−c˜k+1)2−(b˜k+1−c˜k)2|<0.2rL+r
2
L
2
(c˜k+1−c˜k)2, (153)
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using which the rest of the proof is straightforward. 
Proof of Lemma 16. Using Corollary 2, it is straightforward to show that |sk − ck| < 1.1r¯x¯m+1.
Evaluating the derivative of J˜L(aL) at aL = sk, we get
d
daL
J˜L(sk)=2
∫ ∞
−∞
(aF (sk)− aF (s))(1− d
ds
aF (s))φ(s− sk)ds, (154)
where we have also used sk = aF (sk). We consider the case sk ≤ c˜k yielding ddaL J˜L(sk) ≤ 0
(the other case is quite similar). Noting that for s < sk, ddsaF (s) > 1 requires s < mk + 0.5, we
can obtain
− d
daL
J˜L(sk) ≤ 2
∫ ∞
sk
(aF (s)− aF (sk))φ(s− sk)ds
+ 2
∫ mk+0.5
−∞
(aF (sk)− aF (s))(1− d
ds
aF (s))φ(s− sk)ds. (155)
With a bit of manipulation similar to the ones used in Lemma 11-15, we can obtain∫ ∞
sk
(aF (s)− aF (sk))φ(s− sk)ds
≤1.01r¯
2(x¯k + x¯k+1)
2
4
√
2pi
+
4.68
¯
x21e
−2(
¯
x1−2)
√
2pie4σ4
. (156)
As for the second term, similarly∫ mk+0.5
−∞
(aF (sk)− aF (s))(1− d
ds
aF (s))φ(s− sk)ds
< (1 + r¯)2x¯2m+1φ(2¯
x1 − 1.1r¯x¯m+1) + (1 + r¯)2
¯
x21φ(¯
x1 − 0.5− 1.1r¯x¯m+1). (157)
By putting the above inequalities together and noting
¯
x1 ≥ 2
√
2 lnσ + 2 and σ ≥ 300, it is a
matter of some machinery to verify that
0 ≤− d
daL
J˜L(sk)<
1.01r¯2(x¯k + x¯k+1)
2
2
√
2pi
+ 0.1r¯2
¯
x1. (158)
On the other hand, as we showed before d
2
da2L
J˜L(sk) ≥ 2(1 − 0.45r¯2σ2), meaning that sk is at
most 1.01r¯
2(x¯k+x¯k+1)
2
4
√
2pi(1−0.45r¯2σ2) +
0.1r¯2
¯
x1
2(1−0.45r¯2σ2) < 0.42r
2
L(
x¯k+x¯k+1
2
)2 + 0.08r2L¯
x1 away from the minimizer at
which the first derivative is zero. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 17. We start by finding the fixed point of E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bk], that is E[aL(θ)|sˆk, θ ∈
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Bk] = sˆk. sˆk is the solution of the following equation∫ bk+1
bk
(aL(θ)− sˆk)φ(aL(θ)− sˆk)φ( θ
σ
)dθ = 0. (159)
Noting that sˆk is close to ck and in particular |aL(θ) − sˆk| < 1 for θ ∈ Bk, and that xφ(x) is
increasing for |x| < 1, together with the fact that aL(θ) ≤ aL(bk) + r¯(θ − bk), we obtain∫ bk+1
bk
(r¯(θ − bk)− (sˆk − aL(bk)))φ(r¯(θ − bk)− (sˆk − aL(bk)))φ( θ
σ
)dθ≥0. (160)
Therefore by finding the solution of∫ bk+1
bk
r¯(θ − y)φ(r¯(θ − y))φ(θ
σ
)dθ = 0, (161)
we can upper-bound the fixed point sˆk as sˆk ≤ aL(bk) + r¯(y − bk). Simplifying (161) yields
y = Eψ¯y [θ|θ ∈ Bk], (162)
where ψ¯y ∼ N( r¯2σ21+r¯2σ2y, σ
2
1+r¯2σ2
). A quick bound for y can be obtained from Eψ¯y [θ|θ ∈ Bk] ≤
ek +
r¯2σ2
1+r¯2σ2
y, which yields y − ek ≤ r¯2σ2ek < 0.1x¯k. An alternative representation of (162) is
y√
1 + r¯2σ2
= EN(0,σ2)[θ|bk−∆bk(y)≤θ≤bk+1−∆bk(y)+ r¯
2σ2(bk+1−bk)
1 +
√
1+r¯2σ2
], (163)
where ∆bk(y) = r¯
2σ2
1+r¯2σ2+
√
1+r¯2σ2
y + r¯
2σ2
1+
√
1+r¯2σ2
(y − bk) > 0. A useful property of normal
distribution is that ( ∂
∂a
+ ∂
∂b
)EN(0,σ2)[θ|a ≤ θ ≤ b] = 1−VarN(0,σ2)[θ|a ≤ θ ≤ b] ≥ 1− (b−a)
2
(1+
√
3)2σ2
.
Also, ∂
∂b
EN(0,σ2)[θ|a ≤ θ ≤ b] ≤ 12 . Applying these to the above equation we can obtain
0 ≤ y√
1 + r¯2σ2
+ ∆bk(y)− ek ≤ r¯
2σ2(bk+1 − bk)
2(1 +
√
1 + r¯2σ2)
+
(bk+1 − bk)2
(1 +
√
3)2σ2
∆bk(y), (164)
where ek = EN(0,σ2)[θ|θ ∈ Bk]. Simplifying this, along with y(bk+1−bk) < 2.2σ2 (which follows
from cQm(c
Q
m − bQm) ≤ 1), we can arrive at
|y − ek| ≤ 0.4r¯2σ2(bk+1 − bk). (165)
Recalling sˆk ≤ aL(bk)+r¯(y−bk), and that aL(bk) ≤ ck−
¯
r(ck−bk) ≤ ck−rL(ck−bk)+(rL−
¯
r)x¯k,
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we can reach at
sˆk ≤ (1− rL)ck + rLek + r2Lx¯k + 0.4r¯3σ2(x¯k + x¯k+1). (166)
Following a similar argument to lower-bound sˆk, we can show that |sˆk− (1− rL)ck− rLek| ≤
r2Lx¯k + 0.4r¯
3σ2(x¯k + x¯k+1).
To find the fixed point of aF (s) in Bk (that is aF (sk) = sk), we first note that sˆk lies within
the interval [ck − 2r¯x¯m+1, ck + 2r¯x¯m+1]. Moreover, for s ∈ [ck − 2r¯x¯m+1, ck + 2r¯x¯m+1], using
Lemma 9 we can obtain d
ds
aF (s) < 0.01. This along with|aF (sk)− sk| < 1.5r¯x¯m+1 implies that
for s ∈ [ck − 2r¯x¯m+1, ck + 2r¯x¯m+1], we have aF (s) ∈ [ck − 2r¯x¯m+1, ck + 2r¯x¯m+1]. Therefore,
|sk − sˆk|< |sˆk − aF (sˆk)|
1− 0.01 =
|E[aL(θ)|sˆk, θ ∈ Bk]− E[aL(θ)|sˆk]|
1− 0.01 . (167)
Assume sˆk ≥ ck (the other case is similar). We have already shown as part of Lemma 9 that
while observing s ∈ [ck, ck+1], the effect of intervals other than Bk∪Bk+1 on aF (s) is negligible
(as given by (79)). Similarly, and by using Lemma 8, we can show that
Prob[θ∈Bk+1|sˆk](E[aL(θ)|sˆk, θ∈Bk+1]−E[aL(θ)|sˆk, θ∈Bk]) ≤1.17e−∆k+1δ(∆k+1+2r¯x¯m+1),
(168)
where δ = mk+1 − sˆk. Combining this and (79), we can arrive at
|E[aL(θ)|sˆk, θ ∈ Bk]− E[aL(θ)|sˆk]| <10−4r2Lx¯1. (169)
After all, we have
|sk − (1− rL)ck − rLek|<1.02r2Lx¯k+0.41r¯3σ2(x¯k + x¯k+1) < 1.9r2Lx¯k+1. (170)
The proof has to be modified for the tail case k = m, since in the tail |aL(θ) − sˆm| < 1
does not hold for all θ ∈ Bm. To handle this, we define E[aL(θ)|sˆm, θ ∈ Bˆm] = sˆm, where
Bˆm = [bm, bm+σ
2−σ]. It is easy to verify that r¯(σ2−σ) < 1 and hence |aL(θ)− sˆm| < 1 holds
in this interval. We also need to find an alternative to the variance inequality VarN(0,σ2)[θ|θıBk] ≤
(bk+1−bk)2
(1+
√
3)2σ2
. Here we use VarN(0,σ2)[θ|θ ∈ Bm] ≤ (em − bm)2. Also, we can show ∆bm(y) < r¯em,
from which and a bit manipulation we can reach at VarN(0,σ2)[θ|θ ≥ bm −∆bm(y)] ≤ (em−bm)
2
(1−r¯)2 .
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We can then show that the results derived above also holds for Bˆm. More precisely,
|sˆm − (1− rL)cm − rLEN(0,σ2)[θ|θ ∈ Bˆm]| < r2Lx¯m + 0.4r¯3σ2(x¯m + x¯m+1). (171)
Let θb = bm + σ2 − σ. We can easily observe that
em − EN(0,σ2)[θ|θ ∈ Bˆm] ≤ Prob[θ ≥ θb|θ∈Bm](EN(0,σ2)[θ|θ ≥ θb]−EN(0,σ2)[θ|θ∈Bˆm])
≤ φ(
θb
σ
)
φ( bm
σ
)
(θb +
σ2
θb
− bm) < 10−4r3Lσ. (172)
We also need to bound |E[aL(θ)|sˆm, θ ∈ Bˆm] − E[aL(θ)|sˆm]|. We start with |E[aL(θ)|sˆm, θ ∈
Bˆm]− E[aL(θ)|sˆm, θ ∈ Bm]|. First, note that
aL(θb) ≥ cm +
¯
r(σ2 − 2σ) > cm + 3r¯σ, (173)
which along |sˆm − cm| < r¯σ implies that |aL(θb) − sˆm| > 2r¯σ. Consequently, |sˆm − aL(θ′)| <
|aL(θb)− sˆm| for all θ′ ∈ Bˆm. Similar to (62), we can hence derive
Prob[θ|sˆm, θ ∈ Bm] ≤
e−
(σ−1)2
2 φ( θ
σ
)
σ(1− Φ( θb
σ
))
, (174)
for θ ≥ θb. Using this along with E[aL(θ)|sˆm, θ ∈ Bˆm] ≥ cm − r¯σ, we can then obtain
E[aL(θ)|sˆm, θ ∈ Bm]− E[aL(θ)|sˆm, θ ∈ Bˆm] < 10−4r3Lσ. (175)
Therefore, the same steps as in the non-tail case can be followed in this case as well, resulting
in (170) to also hold for k = m. 
Proof of Theorem 1. We can find by direct calculation of the optimal quantizer for m = 25 that
xQ1
σ
> 0.041. On the other hand, 2
√
2 lnσ+5
σ
< 0.04 for σ ≥ 300. This implies that 25 ∈M(σ) for
σ ≥ 300 and hence is nonempty.
We next use (34) to verify that Property 2 is also preserved by the best response, completing
the proof of the invariance of AmL . It suffices to show that
|eˆk − cQk |+ 0.42rL(
x¯k + x¯k+1
2
)2 + 2rLx¯k+1 ≤ 2.9. (176)
To bound |eˆk− cQk |, we first note that ∂∂bˆk eˆk +
∂
∂bˆk+1
eˆk = 1− VarN(0,σ2)[θ|θ∈Bˆk]σ2 . Using the inequality
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Var[θ|θ ∈ Bˆk] > (eˆk − E[θ|bˆk ≤ θ ≤ eˆk])(E[θ|eˆk ≤ θ ≤ bˆk+1]− eˆk) and Lemma 1 we can show
that
VarN(0,σ2)[θ|θ ∈ Bˆk] > ¯xk¯xk+1
2(1 +
√
e)
, (177)
yielding |eˆk − cQk | < 2.9(1− ¯xk¯xk+12(1+√e)σ2 ). Therefore to have (176), it suffices to have
0.42(x¯k + x¯k+1)
2
4
¯
xk
¯
xk+1
+
2x¯k+1
¯
xk
¯
xk+1
≤ 2.9
2(1 +
√
e)
, (178)
which is satisfied for sufficiently large values of σ (e.g., σ ≥ 300) on noting that 0.42(e+1)2
4e
≤
2.9
2(1+
√
e)
. This completes the proof of the invariance of AmL .
The existence of an equilibrium with a∗L(θ) ∈ AmL and a∗F (s) = Eδ[a∗L|s] follows from an argu-
ment similar to the one used in [1] for the existence of an optimal solution. Let (anL(θ), a
n
F (s) =
Eδ[anL|s]) be a maximizing sequence for the ex-ante expected payoff of the leader, that is,
lim
n→∞
Eθ[uL(θ, anL(θ), anF (s))] = sup{Eθ[uL(θ, aL(θ), aF (s))]|aL(θ) ∈ AmL , aF (s) = Eδ[aL|s]}.
(179)
The first step is to show that this supremum is attained for a pair of strategies (a∗L(θ), a
∗
F (s) =
Eδ[a∗L|s]) with a∗L(θ) ∈ AmL . Strategies aL(θ) ∈ AmL are increasing and bounded (|aL(θ)| <
|θ| + 1). Using Lemma 8 in [1] (which is a variation of the Helly’s selection principle based
on the diagonalisation argument), there exists a subsequence ankL (θ) converging pointwise to a
limit strategy aL(θ), and so do the interval endpoints and fixed points, that is, {bnkj } → {bj}
and {cnkj } → {cj}. Relabel (ankL (θ), ankF (s)) as (anL(θ), anF (s)). From anL(θ) → aL(θ), it is easy
to see that aL(θ) satisfies Property 1-2. Property 3, however, concerns the derivative of aL and
thus cannot be deduced directly from pointwise convergence. We now turn into the follower’s
best response sequence anF (s), claiming that a
n
F (s) → aF (s). The proof is again similar to the
approach used in Theorem 1 in [1]: First note that
anF (s) = Eδ[anL|s] =
∫∞
−∞ a
n
L(θ)φ(s− anL(θ))φ( θσ )dθ∫∞
−∞ φ(s− anL(θ))φ( θσ )dθ
. (180)
For every s ∈ R, functions φ(s − x) and xφ(s − x) are continuous and bounded functions
of x. Therefore, φ(s − anL(θ)) → φ(s − aL(θ)) and anL(θ)φ(s − anL(θ)) → aL(θ)φ(s − aL(θ))
pointwise in θ, for all s. This proves anF (s)→ aF (s) using bounded convergence theorem. We can
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similarly show that uL(θ, anL(θ), a
n
F (s)) → uL(θ, aL(θ), aF (s)) pointwise in θ and subsequently
Eθ[uL(θ, anL(θ), anF (s))] → Eθ[uL(θ, aL(θ), aF (s))], that is, the supremum in (179) is attained
by the pair of the strategies (aL(θ), aF (s) = Eδ[aL|s]), though not ruling out the possibility of
aL(θ) /∈ AmL .
Exploiting the fact that aF is analytic and that ddsaF (s) = Var[aL|s] and following an argument
similar to above, we can then show that d
ds
anF (s)→ ddsaF (s) pointwise in s. Therefore, the best
response characteristics of the follower to a strategy in AmL (as given in Lemma 6-7 and Corollary
1-2) which also involves bounds on the derivative, hold for aF (s). These conditions force the
best response of the leader to aF (s), denoted by a˜L(θ), to lie in AmL . On the other hand,
Eθ[uL(θ, a˜L(θ), a˜F (s))] ≥ Eθ[uL(θ, a˜L(θ), aF (s))] ≥ Eθ[uL(θ, aL(θ), aF (s))], (181)
where a˜F (s) is the follower’s best response to a˜L(θ) ∈ AmL . Therefore, the pair of the strategies
(a˜L(θ), a˜F (s) = Eδ[a˜L|s]) where a˜L(θ) ∈ AmL attains the supremum in (180), that is, it is a
maximizer for the expected payoff of the leader over AmL .
Finally, from (181) we should have Eθ[uL(θ, a˜L(θ), a˜F (s))] = Eθ[uL(θ, a˜L(θ), aF (s))]. This
implies that a˜F (s) = aF (s) almost surely, otherwise replacing aF (s) with leader’s best response
a˜F (s) would result in a higher expected payoff for the leader. Noting that both a˜F (s) and aF (s)
are analytic, almost surely equivalence implies being identical. This implies that the pair of the
strategies (a˜L(θ), aF (s)) are best responses to each other, and hence correspond to an equilibrium
of the game. 
Proof of Lemma 2. We need to prove that there does not exist an infinitesimal variation of
(a∗L, a
∗
F ), namely (a
δ
L, a
δ
F ), for which U(a
δ
L, a
δ
F ) < U(a
∗
L, a
∗
F ). Noting that U(a
δ
L,E[aδL|s]) ≤
U(aδL, a
δ
F ), we only need to consider the strategies in which the follower’s action is the expected
action of the leader given the observation s (i.e., E[aδL|s]). The idea is to show that for a
sufficiently small δL > 0 and any strategy aδL with ‖aδL − a∗L‖∞ < δL, the best response
image obtained from aδL → aδF → a˜δL lies in AmL . The proof then follows from the fact that
U(a˜δL,E[a˜δL|s]) ≤ U(aδL,E[aδL|s]), and that (a∗L, a∗F ) is the minimizer of U over all pair of
strategies (aL, aF ) with aL ∈ AmL (see the proof of Theorem 1).
To prove the inclusion of a˜δL in A
m
L , it suffices to show that all the properties for the follower’s
best response to a strategy in AmL given specifically by Lemma 9-10 and Lemma 17 also hold
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for aδF , noting that these are all we need to deduce Property 1-3 for the leader’s best response
(which define the set AmL ). What is left is then to show that the properties for a
∗
F given by
Lemma 9-10 and Lemma 17 also hold for aδF (s) = E[aδL|s] for sufficiently small δ. The proof
easily follows from a couple of simple observations. First, it is straightforward to verify that all
the bounds given for a∗F in the aforementioned lemmas are indeed strict. Therefore, by recasting
the corresponding inequalities as continuous functions of δL we can ensure that all of them will
still hold for sufficiently small δL. We elaborate on this in more details in what follows.
We start by verifying that Lemma 5-6 also hold for aδL for small enough δL. In Lemma 5,
aδL(θ)− c∗k ≤ δL + r¯(b∗k+1 − c∗k) ≤ δL + 0.1r¯rL + r¯
c∗k+1 − c∗k
2
≤ δL + 0.1r¯rL + r¯(xQk+1 + 2.9) ≤ r¯x¯k+1, (182)
for small enough δL, where we recall that x¯k+1 = x
Q
k+1 + 3. Similarly we can show that a
δ
L(θ)−
c∗k ≥ −r¯x¯k, hence Lemma 5 also holds for aδL. Next, we study the effect of δL in Lemma 6. As
for (49), using
φ(s− aδL(θ′))
φ(s− aδL(θ))
≥ φ(s− a
∗
L(θ
′))
φ(s− a∗L(θ))
e−δ
2
L−2δLx¯m+1 , (183)
the RHS of the inequality will be multiplied by e−δ2L−2δLx¯m+1 . As a result, the value of ξ in (52)
will be multiplied by eδ2L+2δLx¯m+1 . (56) will then become
E[aδL(θ)|s, b∗m ≤ θ ≤ θ∗c ]− c∗m ≤ δL + 1.128× 1.025eδ
2
L+2δLx¯m+1 r¯x¯m < 0.75r¯x¯m+1, (184)
for sufficiently small δL. For the bound on variance in (57)-(58), let µ∗ = E[a∗L(θ)|s, b∗m ≤ θ ≤
θ∗c ]. Then,
Var[aδL(θ)|s, b∗m ≤ θ ≤ θ∗c ] ≤ Var[a∗L(θ)|s, b∗m ≤ θ ≤ θ∗c ]
+ δ2L + 2δL
√
Var[a∗L(θ)|s, b∗m ≤ θ ≤ θ∗c ]. (185)
Hence, (58) becomes
Var[aδL(θ)|s, b∗m ≤ θ ≤ θ∗c ] ≤1.025eδ
2
L+2δLx¯m+1 × 1.1282r¯2(x¯m + 4x¯
2
mµ¯
σ2
)2
+ δ2L + 2.2δLr¯x¯m < 1.2r¯
2x¯2m, (186)
May 8, 2019 DRAFT
50
for sufficiently small δL. As for the modification required in the tail effect, e
δ2
2 in (60) has to
be replaced with e
(δ+δL)
2
2 , using which we can verify that (62) still holds for small enough δL.
The rest of the changes are similar.
Lemma 7-8 are based on Lemma 5-6, and Lemma 9-10 are derived using Lemma 5-8, hence
also hold for aδF . Finally, in Lemma 17 which is about the fixed points of the follower’s strategy,
noting aδL(b
∗
k) ≤ a∗L(b∗k) + δL, we need to add δL to the RHS of (166). Using this, we can easily
verify that this lemma also holds for aδF . Therefore, all the properties required for the follower’s
strategy to deduce Property 1-3 for the leader’s best response are satisfied for aδF for sufficiently
small δL, indicating that a˜δL lies in A
m
L . This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Using
lim inf
m→∞
(xQ1 )
2
√
3
DQL
= 1, (187)
it suffices to show that DQF ≤ 4
√
2
e
(2−rL)2
(1−rL)2φ(
xQ1√
2
) + r2LD
Q
L . Consider an interval B
Q
k and some
θ ∈ BQk . For any j > k (similarly for j < k), we have
(cQj − aQL(θ))2
(bQj − aQL(θ))2
≤ (2x
Q
j − rLxQj )2
(xQj − rLxQj )2
=
(2− rL)2
(1− rL)2 . (188)
Using this, we can obtain∫
s/∈BQk
(aQF (s)− aQL(θ))2φ(s− aL(θ))ds
≤ (2− rL)
2
(1− rL)2
∫
s/∈BQk
(s− aQL(θ))2φ(s− aQL(θ))ds. (189)
Combining this with the inequality
∫∞
a
x2φ(x)dx ≤ 2 max(xe−x24 )φ( a√
2
), we arrive at∫
s/∈BQk
(aQF (s)− aQL(θ))2φ(s− aQL(θ))ds ≤ 4
√
2
e
φ(
xQ1√
2
). (190)
On the other hand, ∫
s∈BQk
(aQF (s)− aQL(θ))2φ(s− aL(θ))ds
≤ (cQk − aQL(θ))2 = r2L(aQF (θ)− θ)2, (191)
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implying that ∫ ∞
−∞
∫
s∈BQk
(aQF (s)− aQL(θ))2φ(s− aQL(θ))
φ( θ
σ
)
σ
dsdθ ≤
r2L
∫ ∞
−∞
(θ − aQF (θ))2
φ( θ
σ
)
σ
dθ = r2LD
Q
L , (192)
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4. First we note that the minimum value of the cost functional U(aL, aF ) with
rLσ
2 = 1 is asymptotically the same as the optimal cost of Witsenhausen’s problem for k2σ2 = 1.
Using the inequality given by (17) in the proof of Theorem 4 in [15], we can obtain
U∗(σ) > min
P ∗>0.5
{k2P ∗ + 1
15
e−12P
∗}, (193)
noting that in the scalar version of Witsenhausen’s problem we have m = 1. Minimizing the
RHS above we can find U∗(σ) > lnσ
6σ2
+ 1−ln 1.25
12σ2
, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 2. The first part of the theorem follows directly from Lemma 2. Using M(σ) =
{m ∈ N|xQ1 > 2
√
2 lnσ + 4,m ≥ 25} and that mxQ1
σ
≈
√
6pi
4
for large m, we get
M(σ) ≈ {m ∈ N|25 < m <
√
6piσ
8
√
2 lnσ + 20
}. (194)
Denote with x∗1 the minimizer of the asymptotic upper bound on U(a
∗
L, a
∗
F ) given by Lemma 3.
Then, it is easy to verify that limσ→∞
x∗1
2
√
2 lnσ
= 1, which clearly intersects M(σ) for large σ.
The corresponding asymptotic cost is ≈ 8rL lnσ√
3
, hence proving (11). We can use Lemma 3 and
Lemma 4 to show that the equilibrium corresponding to argminm∈M(σ) U(a∗L, a
∗
F ) is at most
8rL lnσ√
3
lnσ
6σ2
= 16
√
3 < 27.8 away from the optimal cost as σ →∞. 
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